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On behalf of the IBM Endowment for The Business of Government, we are pleased to present this report by
Jacques S. Gansler, “Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The Changing Role of Government as the
Provider.”
In this important report, Professor Gansler attempts to clarify the somewhat muddled debate currently under
way across the nation about the various ways in which government can undertake a specific activity: out-
sourcing, competitive sourcing, privatization, public-private partnerships, or government entrepreneurship.
This debate represents a significant evolution in the changing role of government. Professor Gansler argues
that government is now undergoing a major shift away from providing services itself to becoming a “man-
ager of the providers.”
But this new role as “manager of the providers” is fraught with complexity. As Professor Gansler describes
in the report, government now has to make a decision as to which of the following mechanisms can best
accomplish the given program objective: competitive sourcing, privatization, or creation of a public-private
partnership or a government franchise. 
A major contribution of this report is that Professor Gansler directly addresses the six concerns most fre-
quently raised about the shift from “government as the doer” to “government as the manager of the doers.”
Based on his analysis presented in this report, Professor Gansler finds that empirical data refute all six of the
common concerns. Professor Gansler found that market-based government actually improved government
performance, decreased costs, realized savings over time, benefited small businesses, separated few gov-
ernment employees, and gave government even greater control that it has today over government activities. 
We trust that this report will assist government executives in clarifying the current debate about how gov-
ernment can effectively move from “doer” to “manager of doers.”
Paul Lawrence John M. Kamensky
Co-Chair, IBM Endowment for Senior Fellow, IBM Endowment for
The Business of Government The Business of Government
paul.lawrence@us.ibm.com john.kamensky@us.ibm.com
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One of the major changes taking place today in
government management (federal, state, and local)
is the shift from the government as the historic
“provider” of public services to the government as
the “manager of the providers” of services to the
public. The basic rationale for this change is that—
when properly implemented—it results in significant
benefits, in terms of improved performance and
lower costs, to both the government and to the public
being served. Essentially, it is a shift from a monop-
oly supplier (the historic government “provider”) to
a competitive environment. These benefits are real-
ized regardless of whether the winner of the com-
petition is the public or private sector supplier.
While the empirical data (as presented in this
report) demonstrate the benefits of this shift, it is
still not widely understood or accepted. Part of the
resistance is the natural fear of change, especially 
if jobs are at stake. Another part of the resistance is
due to understandable confusion over the details.
The wide variety of approaches (public-private com-
petitions, outsourcing, privatization, public-private
partnerships, government entrepreneurships, etc.)
adds to this confusion. Moreover, there has been
little effort made at defining terms, collecting data
and lessons learned, documenting best practices
and case studies, and developing educational pro-
grams in this area. It is the purpose of this report 
to help in this regard. 
The report is divided into sections. The first section,
“Understanding the Issue,” provides the background
and the highlights of the various sourcing options.
Each of the second through sixth sections examines
one approach and, for each approach, provides a
clear definition; summaries of example case studies
(e.g., for competitive sourcing, for privatization, etc.);
a discussion of strengths and weaknesses; lessons
learned/best practices; actual performance and cost
results achieved; and other relevant considerations—
such as personnel impacts, small business consider-
ations, and government management-control
perceptions. And, in each area, detailed references
are provided for the reader who wants to pursue
further the specifics of the implementation for a
particular issue.
The seventh section of the report, “Contractors in
Security Operations: A Special Case,” examines an
area that, although not a unique sourcing option,
has become a high-interest item for the Department
of Defense and numerous other agencies—namely,
using contractors in security operations (including
combat)—and describes the special considerations
for this area along with some example cases. 
Finally, “Findings and Conclusions” discusses the 
six common arguments against changing the role of
government, summarizes the actual results achieved
for each of these areas, and presents specific recom-
mendations for moving forward.
It is hoped that the material in this report will
help in providing a better understanding of this
important—and, the author believes, essential—
shift in the way government will provide its public
services in the 21st century. 
Overview
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Background
It has always been the stated U.S. federal economic
policy that the government will not produce prod-
ucts or provide services that are available in the
private sector.1 Free enterprise and capitalism are
the basic models of the American system. However,
over the nation’s history the American public has
asked government at all levels to provide more and
more services, to the point where today federal,
state, and local government expenditures make 
up one-third of the gross domestic product of the
nation (with a growing shift from federal to state
and local). And, as government expenditures grew,
so did the number of government employees. In
many cases it was assumed that these governmental
functions should be performed by government
employees, resulting in the build-up of large 
government bureaucracies. 
In recent years the assumption that government 
services must be carried out by government workers
has been questioned. This began first at the state
and local level, where people asked, “Why is
garbage collection or bus transportation an inher-
ently governmental job? Wouldn’t it be better to let
the private sector perform such functions under a
competitively awarded government contract?” In an
effort to meet tight budgets, city council members
and local mayors thus attempted to implement—
in a variety of forms—competitions for this work.2
In some cases, the approach was to allow private
sector competition for the work among firms that
specialized in that business. In other cases, the
work was competed between the current govern-
ment employees and the private sector; while in
still other cases, the work was simply privatized 
by letting private companies bid for the government
capital equipment and employees.3
There was, of course, resistance to these trends
from government workers, their unions, and their
political representatives. Nonetheless, the results 
of these steps were positive. As the advocates had
claimed (and as the large amount of data in this
report will demonstrate), performance improved
and costs were reduced. While this concept was
catching on widely at the state and local levels in
the 1980s and early 1990s, it was not until the
mid-1990s—led by the Department of Defense—
that there was widespread consideration of this
approach taking hold at the federal level.4
With the election of President George W. Bush, it
became official policy for the executive branch. In
his President’s Management Agenda (released in
August 2001), the President stated, “Government
should be market-based—we should not be afraid
of competition, innovation, and choice. Our gov-
ernment must be open to the discipline of com-
petition.” To implement this policy, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) explicitly set 
targets and dates. In response to a congressional
mandate (in 1998, through the Federal Acquisition
Inventory Reform Act [FAIR])5 that all federal agen-
cies must identify those positions that were “not
inherently governmental,” agencies identified
849,389 positions in February 2001. OMB
declared that by 2005, at least half of these posi-
tions should be up for competition in one form or
another. This would affect approximately 50 percent
Understanding the Issue
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of the 1.7 million federal positions considered 
“eligible” for competition (military personnel, for
example, were excluded). Clearly, when fully
implemented, this could potentially have a dramatic
impact on the way the government provides its 
services. It is the intent of this report to explicitly
address the following questions: How could this 
be done? Why is it desirable? What results are
likely to be achieved? 
Selecting the Business Model
Before agencies examine detailed sourcing options
they should first examine their missions and identify
the services they are truly required to provide in
order to perform those missions most effectively.
This effort must consider the fact that governments
have many tools they can use to provide a required
service indirectly. These include grants, loans/
guarantees, the tax code, insurance, and regulation,
as well as several different sourcing options that
can be used to transfer the responsibility to another
organization or level of government. This review
can result in changes to the form of services and
how they are provided. 
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS), for example, was
being overwhelmed by bulk mailings. One distinct
option was to buy more sorting equipment, hire
more employees, and handle the increase in volume.
They came up with a different approach, and instead
offered their customers a discount if they pre-sorted
their mail prior to pickup by the postal service. This
shifted a portion of the USPS workload to the private
sector by simply changing the way they conducted
business. 
Another example is the Veterans Health Adminis-
tration (VHA). The VHA had failed to keep up with
the trend in the health care industry. It was using
the same model of delivering health care developed
in the1950s—in-patient care in large hospitals—
centrally controlled from Washington. In the mid-
1990s the system was reengineered, creating 22
regional networks that integrated the hospitals with
nursing homes and emphasized home health care
and outpatient options. The decentralization and
shift in emphasis allowed regions to significantly
improve the care provided to veterans without
increasing their budgets.6
Once an agency decides on a business and gover-
nance model of how to provide its services, it 
can begin to examine sourcing options for its 
core missions. 
Four Principles of Program Delivery
Based on the large number of cases that have now
been completed at the local, state, and federal lev-
els, four key principles of the market-based approach
for shifting from a monopoly to a competition-based
environment stand out in the implementation area.
1. The key to success is shifting from a monopoly
to a competitive environment. Simply shifting
from a government workforce to a private sec-
tor one while still in a monopoly environment
does not create the incentives required to
achieve the potential performance gains and
cost reductions that a competitive environment
offers. Similarly, after an initial competitive
award is made—either to the public sector
workers or to the private sector—it is essential
that the potential for future competition (in a
few years) still be maintained. 
This potential need not be exercised if the win-
ning performer not only realizes its claimed
performance improvements and cost reductions,
but also continues to demonstrate enhanced
performance at lower costs. But the potential
for competition must be maintained. Unfortu-
nately, it has been found in a number of cases—
particularly when the government workforce
won the initial competition—that this potential
disappeared and the performance and costs
reverted back to monopoly conditions. It is 
the presence of competition (or even the clear
potential for it) that forces the performer to
innovate for higher performance at lower cost.
In the absence of such competition you must
deal with a monopolist; and monopolies, as is
well documented, tend to become inefficient,
ineffective, and unresponsive. Nonetheless,
people somehow believe that because the
monopoly is a public one (i.e., being run by
government employees), it therefore will
(somehow) operate totally in the public inter-
est—and be efficient, effective, and responsive.
As all of the data in this report indicate, that
has not been the case. Shifting to a competitive
environment results in an improvement in effi-
ciency, effectiveness, and responsiveness.
2. The competition must be run for “best value”
rather than simply for “low cost.” The idea,
which comes out of looking at the lessons
learned from prior efforts, is not simply to 
get cheaper services; rather, it is to get better
services at lower costs. This is a dramatically
different approach than simply going to the
“low bidder” who promises to meet “minimal
acceptable performance.” 
This is admittedly a more difficult action for 
the buying organization of the government,
because it requires a serious value judgment 
in comparing potential performance and costs
for each of the bidders (public or private). It
also means that the contract itself must be a
“performance-based contract,” i.e., one that
specifies what the buyer broadly is striving to
achieve, but doesn’t tell the supplier how to do
it. This type of contract is also more difficult to
write—especially when buying services rather
than products—but it is absolutely essential in
order to get the best overall value from the per-
former. This procurement area is one that will
require considerable workforce education and
training in order to skillfully perform best-value
awards on performance-based service contracts.
3. Even when the government contracts out work
to be performed, it does not give up any of 
its control or management responsibilities. In
the case of service contracts, for example, a
recurring problem is the government’s failure 
to maintain responsibility for assuring that the
contracted-out function is performed effectively
and efficiently. This means that the government
still has a strong oversight function: to manage
the contract and to monitor its performance
and cost. If the work is not done properly, the
responsibility still rests with the government. 
Clearly, the government can terminate the con-
tractor as an ultimate control mechanism. Prior
to that action, however, the government should
be continuously monitoring the contractor’s
performance and cost to ensure the required
function is being properly performed. This
point cannot be overemphasized; and yet, as
noted, it has been a major problem in a num-
ber of prior efforts (i.e., the government did not
properly oversee the supplier—public or pri-
vate—once the award was made). 
4. There is a critical need for detailed metrics.
The government manager and the performer
(public or private) must agree at the beginning
of the contract on the key measurements of
performance and cost that will be continuously
monitored and reported. Obviously, these must
relate to the performance and cost measures
associated with the government function being
achieved; and while many of these functions
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Sourcing Approach Definition
Outsourcing Organizational activities are contracted out to vendors or suppliers who specialize
in these activities (usually in a competitive fashion).
Competitive Sourcing Current public providers and private providers compete.
Privatization Current government capital equipment, facilities, and workers are moved into the
private sector—either competitively or on a sole-source basis.
Public-Private Partnerships Attempts are made to combine the best of both the public and private sectors—
either in a competitive or sole-source environment. One type of public-private
partnership is private financing: In private financing, instead of having the govern-
ment provide the resources for public functions, this work is actually financed by
the private sector in a variety of approaches.
Government One government agency specializes in a given function and provides it to other 
Entrepreneurship government agencies or even to the private sector—again, either competitively 
(“Franchising”) or on a sole-source basis.
Table 1: Sourcing Options
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may be long term, shorter-term measurements
must be implemented to determine progress. 
Additionally, these metrics should be com-
pared with historical data and “best practice”
benchmarks to show improving trends in both
performance and cost. In prior efforts, particu-
larly when the government workforce prevailed
in the competition, good visibility into these
metrics was not maintained. This has proven to
be a particularly difficult thing for the govern-
ment providers when they are not clear about
their total-cost basis in the first place, as they
do not have any initial benchmarks to utilize. 
To achieve such metrics for the government
workforce will often mean a transition to some
form of activities-based costing, so that one
can determine the actual government total cost
associated with the function being performed.
(This would include all government “indirect”
costs that support the particular function being
performed, and costs which are not currently
identified to that function—such as finance,
legal, personnel, etc.)
Understanding Sourcing Options
As can be seen in Table 1, these choices cover a
wide spectrum—from more work being done inter-
nally, to more work being shared, to full external
services (but still under government management).
Further, there are appropriate times and places for
each of these techniques as well as best practices
that should be applied (practices based on lessons
learned from previous attempts at either the state,
local, or federal levels). There are pros and cons for
each approach, and the following sections dis-
cuss—with examples—appropriate applications for
each as well as the likely results (again, based
upon the results of prior demonstrations in each
category). 
Needless to say, there are no hard and fast rules
that can be applied in this area; which technique 
is used and what results are actually achieved will
vary considerably from case to case depending on
the unique circumstances in each. Nonetheless,
when properly implemented, the overall results are
consistent—both qualitatively and quantitatively.
The key, of course, is how to do them “right.” 
One of the things that scares people away from this
area is the sheer number of different ways in which
to approach the shift from the government as the
“provider” to the government as the “manager of
the providers.” The reality is that there is no right
answer to this dilemma other than the following
points highlighted earlier in The Four Principles of
Program Delivery: create the right incentives via
competition; utilize best-value rather than low 
cost in the competitions; continue to manage the
provider (public or private) after the award; and 
utilize performance-based and cost-based metrics
that are monitored throughout the contract. Beyond
these basic guidelines, each case can be treated as
an individual event, and the government managers
need to make their own assessment as to which of
the various forms discussed herein would best fit
the situation. In fact, it may well be that a number
of the forms fit the situation, and that it becomes a
question of “management judgment” as to which
would be appropriate for that individual case. The
important thing to realize is that if the basic princi-
ples—particularly that of competition—are utilized,
there should be significant performance improve-
ments and cost reductions from any of the various
forms to be considered. 
Nonetheless, it is appropriate to define the six
approaches, to provide a few examples of each
along with comments on observed “best practices,”
and to review the actual results of these efforts.
With these data, a government manager should be
in a good position to both argue the case for the
change and anticipate what are likely to be the
benefits. With this in mind, the following sections
address the five categories introduced in Table 1,
presenting the most common ones first, then moving
to those less frequently used.
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Definition
Outsourcing is a management strategy that contracts
out organizational activities to vendors or suppliers
who specialize in these activities in order to perform
them more efficiently and effectively. Outsourcing is
defined as the practice of turning over entire business
functions to an outside vendor that ostensibly can
perform the specialized tasks in question better and
less expensively than the organization choosing to
outsource.7 Outsourcing differs from privatization 
in that in outsourcing, the workload is shifted from
in-house government providers to the private sector,
but no transfer or sale of assets has occurred. Out-
sourcing or “contracting out” still requires the gov-
ernment to remain fully responsible for the provision
of all services and management decisions. Other
common outsourcing transactions include “direct
vendor delivery,” hiring of long-term trained (but
private) staff, and vouchers.
Outsourcing can be done either sole-source or
through competitive bidding. However, one of the
major advantages of outsourcing is the potential 
for introducing competition among firms and to
encourage innovation for performance improve-
ments and productivity gains, so competitive bid-
ding should be used whenever possible. And, to
gain the benefits of greater performance at lower
costs, the competitions should be based on the
“best value” combination of performance and cost
(rather than simply “low bid” to a minimum perfor-
mance requirement). Also, so that the government
does not get stuck with a monopoly supplier who
subsequently reduces performance and/or raises
prices, the government should assume that it main-
tains the option of subsequent competition (but
only needs to exercise this option if performance 
or costs do not meet expectations).
Cost savings are generally considered to increase 
as the complexity of the outsourced application
increases.8 According to one report, companies that
outsource to a web hosting company can save up
to 40 percent in costs, while increasing the quality
of their infrastructure.9 Outsource vendors provide
superior performance at lower cost because the
function they provide is their core function, they
have good specialists, and they invest in improving
their techniques and technology to stay competitive
in their market. Outsourcing allows firms to con-
centrate on their core functions and grow their
business while the government benefits from the
higher performance at lower costs, and the ability
to use employees only when they are needed
(rather than having permanent employees). 
The reason outsourcing sometimes fails is that out-
sourcing candidates were not examined carefully
before making the selection decision. To prevent
these failures, management should examine qualifi-
cations of potential outsourcing candidates and
should choose the one that best fits with the firm’s
strategic goals. Issues such as prior experience, cul-
ture clash, training needs, metrics and control, and
the level of relationship between the parties must be
carefully considered. Organizations should build
relationship management capabilities to develop
trust between themselves and the outsourced firm.
Although outsourcing involves signing a contract,
there are important differences between the terms
“outsourcing” and “contracting” as they are used.
Outsourcing
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Firms use contractors when they need specialized
staff services for relatively shorter periods of time.
In addition, contractor personnel are usually inte-
grated into an organization’s normal operations. 
In contrast, outsourcing agreements are usually
long term, with an average of seven to 10 years.
However, the government needs to frequently mon-
itor contractor performance and cost—and main-
tain the option of termination or competition at any
time—if results are undesirable. Finally, the out-
sourcing firm is generally off-site, and performance
measurement of the outsource firm is not through
assessment of individual tasks, but through compli-
ance with some type of service level agreement. 
Case Studies
1. National Mail Order Pharmacy Program of
the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia
(DSCP)10
In the early 1990s, DSCP competitively bought the
services of a private contractor, Merck-Medco
Managed Care, to buy and distribute prescriptions
to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 7.2 million
eligible active-duty service members, retirees, and
dependents. This outsourcing contract resulted in
significant quality and customer service improve-
ments, as well as reductions in the costs of medicine
to the military customers by 30 to 70 percent—prices
lower than those paid by regional hospitals. The
savings to the government is at least 40 percent. 
Two three-state regional pilots were conducted in
1993, and the program expanded to over a dozen
states in 1995. The national contract was signed 
in 1997. Responsibilities of the DSCP contractor
include receiving prescriptions, certifying benefi-
ciaries’ eligibility, making sure that participants are
taking the right drugs in the right amounts, moni-
toring drug interactions, verifying prescriptions, 
and dispensing and mailing the drugs. The firm 
also runs a customer service center. DSCP devel-
oped an automated system to monitor contractor
compliance with all contract requirements, but is
not otherwise involved in drug delivery. 
Savings and service improvements: The National
Mail Order Pharmacy saves money and time for
military service members and their dependents,
and frees up DoD funds to improve other health
programs. The program gives DSCP an opportunity
to serve a whole new class of customers while
reducing beneficiaries’ co-payments—$23 million
on 1.3 million prescriptions in FY 1999, while sav-
ing DoD an estimated $55 million. DSCP monitors
drug prices continuously and sends Merck-Medco
an automated pricing file each month to ensure
that DoD is getting the best possible prices. DSCP
sold more than $4.8 billion in supplies worldwide in
1999, while reducing the inventory it held by 19
percent over 1998. The center’s staff has also been
reduced from 7,000 in 1993 to 2,900 in 2000. 
The service received by the military personnel and
their dependents has also improved a great deal.
Before the mail order program, those eligible for
DoD drug benefits had to drive great distances to 
military pharmacies or retail drug stores, where they
paid co-payments of 15 percent to 25 percent of 
the commercial cost of pharmaceuticals. However,
under the mail order pharmacy, active-duty members
pay no co-payments and their dependents pay a
fixed charge of $4, while retirees and their depen-
dents pay a fixed charge of $8 per prescription.
Further, beneficiaries can get up to a 90-day supply
of drugs (as opposed to a 30-day limit imposed by
retail pharmacies), and the drugs are mailed to their
homes, making it easier for many personnel. 
Conclusions: As a result of implementing this new
service, inventories were reduced by 19 percent
and staffing was reduced by 58 percent. Apart from
the savings and service improvements the program
provided, it has demonstrated innovative contracting
and transitioned DCSP into a supply chain and rela-
tionships manager—rather than buyer and distributor.
2. Air Force’s Hunley Park Military Family
Housing Renovation11
When the Air Force inherited Charleston Naval
Base from the Navy in 1996, it also received the
responsibility of the Hunley Park military family
housing renovation project. The houses required
extensive renovation, including asbestos remedia-
tion and underground utility work. Congress allo-
cated $7.4 million to help begin the renovation 
in November 1997, and wanted the money spent
by March 1, 1998. Many of the previous Air 
Force housing projects resulted in cost overruns.
Additionally, the contracts usually involved schedule
slips. These issues forced the Air Force to develop 
a new contracting strategy to avoid the problems
14
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and complete the project within the mandated time
schedule. The Air Force’s normal approach, which
typically required 180 days just to develop a
design, would not work. Instead, they formed an
integrated project team to manage the contracting
and other aspects of the project concurrently, rather
than having the various phases laid out end to end
over the period of a year. The design phase, with
the help of this innovative approach, took only two
months instead of the normal six months, reducing
the completion time by 66 percent.
The acquisition team required all the bidders to
provide evidence of past performance in whole-house
renovation and underground utility upgrades. The
“best value” approach was used, trading off price
with past performance. This resulted in the lowest
bidder being eliminated because of a limited expe-
rience base. The contract was eventually awarded
to H&N Constructors, a small firm in Louisville,
Kentucky.
One of the common problems in the past was
costly renovation contract modifications caused by
unforeseen problems encountered during construc-
tion. Instead of trying to define the scope of the
project without knowing all of the potential prob-
lems that can cause modification, the team decided
that the contract should require the contractor to
experiment with just a few homes first. The proto-
typing revealed the actual condition of the houses
and how much material and equipment would be
required to finish the project. After the prototyping,
the team let the future occupants tour the houses
and make suggestions. This acquisition innovation
(i.e., user reviews of prototype) added up to a total
cost increase of just $35,000 or 0.06 percent, a
mere fraction of a typical renovation project overrun.
According to interviews with current occupants,
they are truly satisfied with the renovated houses. 
Conclusions: This project shows how performance-
based service contracting can save significant
amounts of time and money, even when the winner
of the contract isn’t the lowest-price bidder. They
used performance-based contracting and prototyp-
ing and took user feedback, all of which proved to
be useful strategies for the outsourcing project. The
decrease from cost overruns alone saved at least 5
percent.
3. The Navy’s Sailor Assisted Move (SAM)
Program12 
Traditionally, the Military Traffic Management
Command awarded contracts to the lowest bidder
without performance considerations. Additionally,
they would divide up service members’ moving
business evenly among all the qualified carriers.
DoD surveys indicated that more than 75 percent
of the personnel moving were unhappy with the
existing system. Additionally, 25 percent experi-
enced property loss or damage during the moves,
more than twice the rate outside the military.
Moving is big business in the military—military ser-
vices pay commercial carriers more than $1.2 billion
annually to move 650,000 military personnel. DoD
is the single largest customer in the property ship-
ment industry, accounting for more than 15 percent
of the industry’s business. 
In contrast to the traditional approach, the SAM
program allows sailors to choose their own moving
companies based on their own or others’ experi-
ence with the firms. During the move, sailors can
check on the status and location of their household
goods and alter delivery plans as needed. In addi-
tion, for the first time service members receive full-
value protection against property loss and damage.
Additionally, they can be reimbursed by directly
negotiating with the carrier in just two weeks—com-
pared to depreciated reimbursement of damage after
several months, when military legal officials filed
claims for damage under the old system. Letting
sailors choose firms based on their track records
adds a vital performance piece to the deal. The car-
riers are also happier with the system that rewards
high performance and eliminates paperwork and
bureaucracy. 
In customer surveys, 95 percent of SAM customers
reported satisfaction with their moves, compared 
to 23 percent under the traditional moving program.
In 1999, during the second year of the program,
SAM attracted about 25 percent of the sailors eligi-
ble to participate, a 1,500 percent increase over
participation in 1998. In addition to improved 
customer satisfaction, damage claims under SAM
dropped from one in every four moves to one in
12; and, according to the Navy, the dollar value of
an average claim has dropped 50 percent, from
$550 to $224. The potential savings are huge. In
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1996 alone, service members filed more than $100
million in damage claims under DoD’s traditional
moving program, about 10 percent of program
costs. 
Conclusions: Letting the sailors choose contractors
based on performance records and shifting to 
a competitive best-value (vs. “lowest bidder”)
approach improved performance and decreased
costs significantly. Savings from damage costs alone
are 87 percent. There was a 300 percent customer
satisfaction improvement, and a 66 percent reduc-
tion in the number of damage claims.
4. The Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI)13
The NMCI is a comprehensive, enterprise-wide
contracting-out initiative that will make the full
range of network-based information services avail-
able to sailors and Marines for day-to-day activities
and in war. When the actual costs figures are used,
from the initial rollout of NMCI seats (desktop com-
puter workstations) at seven sites, the average cost
per seat before NMCI was about $3,545 per year,
and the cost of an average NMCI seat is $4,179.
Although the NMCI cost is 18 percent higher, the
price of an NMCI seat includes capabilities that
were not available in the pre-NMCI environment,
such as compliance with DoD mandates, records
management, public key infrastructure, and informa-
tion security upgrades. If the pre-NMCI estimates
are adjusted to reflect these added capabilities, 
the original seat cost would increase to at least
$4,286—more than 2 percent higher than the
NMCI seat cost. The decision to undertake the
NMCI initiative was not based solely on cost;
rather, it focused on performance improvements
(including security) that the Navy would not be
able to provide through the traditional information
technology approach. In addition, the Navy and
Marine Corps are obtaining all the benefits of a
state-of-the-art, fully integrated information system. 
Conclusions: Cost-benefit analysis is a necessary
tool and a significant part of agency decisions. The
contracting in this case resulted in capability and
performance improvements too costly or not possible
for the Navy to achieve itself—and the competitive
outsourcing controlled the costs.
Lessons Learned and
Recommendations
1. Use performance-based contracting instead 
of contracts based on fixed costs. Performance-
based contracts do not list tasks but state the
results sought or problems to be solved. This
takes the performance risk off the government
and shifts it to the contractor, and decreases
the likelihood of cost overruns. Contracts pre-
pared this way contain performance measures
agreed upon by both parties. 
2. Choose contractors according to “best value”
by trading off performance and price instead of
simply awarding to the lowest bidder. Issues
Strengths of Outsourcing:
• Outsourcing is more efficient (and reduces costs
significantly) because: 
– It harnesses competition and brings the 
pressure of the marketplace to bear on the
inefficient producers.
– It permits better management control by
freeing government managers of most of 
the distracting influences of overtly political
organizations and civil service constraints.
– Managers can see more directly the costs
and benefits of their decisions.
• Outsourcing enables the government to take
advantage of specialized skills, new technology,
and innovation that are lacking in its own 
organization.
• Outsourcing can reduce dependence on a 
single supplier (i.e., the government), and the
potential for future competition provides a 
continuing incentive for higher performance 
at lower cost.
Weaknesses of Outsourcing:
• Outsourcing can limit the flexibility of govern-
ment in responding to emergencies if not 
provided for in advance, via the contract.
• Contracting processes can be complex, time-
consuming, and costly if proper management
and a standardized process are not provided.
• Outsourcing can cause personnel disruptions
and transition problems if not planned well.
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such as past performance, culture clash, train-
ing needs, metrics and control, and the level 
of relationship between the parties must be
carefully considered. The organization should
build relationship management capabilities to
develop trust between themselves and the out-
sourced firm.
3. Use prototyping and pilot implementations for
outsourcing projects to make an estimation of
total costs, scope of the project, necessary sup-
plies and equipment, and to foresee problems
that are likely to be faced during the imple-
mentation. Obtain user feedback along the way
and incorporate lessons learned into the imple-
mentation. (Whenever possible, use competitive
prototypes.)
4. Apply integrated (with “bundled” functions)
outsourcing. Outsourcing should be done in 
an integrated (multifunction) way for improve-
ments in efficiency and performance. Make the
outsourcing decisions by contracting similar
functions (or functions that can be done by the
same contractor) to the same contractor instead
of to a number of them. An effective and
closely integrated management of services is
essential to applying these principles. In addi-
tion to savings from economies of scale and
from integrating the tasks of different functions,
having larger bids also attracts a larger number
of and more qualified contractors, decreasing
the resulting bid. It also allows the winner to
re-engineer the multiple functions for far better
performance and significant additional cost
savings. In addition, it should be noted that
bundling need not reduce the amount of small
business contracts, and would even improve it,
if it is made a subcontracting requirement of
the winning bidder. The key in making bundling
decisions is to look at similar samples in the
industry.
5. The larger the award, the greater the savings.
The quantitative benefits of larger-sized awards
for outsourcing would be very similar to those
shown in Table 5 (namely, larger percent savings
with larger size awards, and far fewer awards
with very little savings). 
6. Success requires strong managerial support,
skill, and knowledge.14 In a study on informa-
tion technology (IT) outsourcing, it was found
that management played a key role in the suc-
cess of the contracts. Overall, the benefits of 
IT outsourcing are many: cost savings, greater
access and flexibility in using appropriate tech-
nology, and utilization of skilled IT personnel.
But in order to obtain these benefits, manage-
ment at the top needs to be supportive and
involved in the process; managers must allocate
the necessary amount of time and resources at
all stages of the process; managers need strong,
continually updated procurement skills and
knowledge; and frequent communication must
occur within the partnership of agencies and
their service providers.
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Definition
“Competitive sourcing” assumes a competition 
for work between the government and the private
sector, and can result in activities being performed
either by government (in-house) or by contract per-
sonnel depending upon who wins the competition.
Competitive sourcing differs from outsourcing in
that outsourcing assumes that the in-house (i.e.,
within government) workload will be contracted
out to the private sector. It also differs from privati-
zation, in which the government transfers the own-
ership of its equipment and facilities involved in
performing the function to the private sector. 
Privatization and contracting out policies are sub-
ject to the theoretical assumption, a priori, that 
private sector service delivery is always less costly
and is always of an equal or better quality than
public sector service delivery. Public-private com-
petition (“competitive sourcing”) makes no such
ideological value judgment, but rather treats the
question as an empirical one subject to testing.
Public-private competition is predicated on the
notion that it is not the ownership of the service
delivery (public or private) that leads to improved
service quality and lower service costs, but rather
the presence and degree of competition.15
Various Forms 
The type of public-private competition that covers
most federal government work is governed by OMB
Circular A-76. Depot competitions are excluded
from A-76, but generally follow a similar process
(see Case 5 below regarding a maintenance depot
public-private competition). Other approaches are
possible, such as using the normal Federal Acquisition
Regulations for competition (i.e., “FAR-Based”),
and there are many state and local approaches.
These latter forms of public-private competition are
often ad hoc approaches (public sector service
delivery is simply compared to private sector deliv-
ery), or utilize informal bidding (public sector sub-
mits informal bids). An example of a local and state
approach with a less formal bidding process is the
competitive sourcing of the road and repair work 
in Indianapolis (explained in Case 1).
A-76 Process
In 1966, OMB issued Circular A-76: Performance of
Commercial Activities, which established the policy
for acquiring commercial activities. In 1979, OMB
issued procedures for A-76 cost comparison studies
to determine whether commercial activities should
be performed by government, by another federal
agency, or by the private sector.16 The objective of
A-76 is to provide a “fair” public-private competitive
sourcing process, seeking to determine the most
cost-effective method of obtaining services that are
available from the commercial market. Because 
the A-76 process is very complicated and presents
a considerable administrative burden, many circu-
lars have been issued since 1966 that simplify the
cost comparison procedures, provide options for
“reinventing government” operations, and identify
potential positions to be “studied” (the term-of-art
used to describe the public-private competition
process). OMB is currently revising the circular in
an effort to streamline the process and make it
more equitable. Their goal is to have the new circular
approved and released in the second quarter of 2003.
Competitive Sourcing
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At present, an A-76 study requires an agency to
develop a performance work statement (PWS) to
identify the work to be done; to prepare a govern-
ment in-house cost estimate based upon a Most
Efficient Organization (MEO) that can accomplish
the work; to solicit bids to perform this work from
the private sector; and to compare this estimate
with the lowest or best-value offer from the private
sector. The government converts to performance by
the private sector if the offer is lower than the in-
house estimate either by 10 percent of direct per-
sonnel costs or by $10 million over the length of
the specified performance period. The time period
established for cost comparisons is 24 months for 
a single function and 48 months for multifunction
competitions. 
It is important to note that the government’s bid of
the MEO is almost always significantly less than its
current (monopoly-based) costs. The presence of
competition creates the previously missing incen-
tive to significantly improve processes to lower
costs while increasing performance.
Agencies are supposed to submit a list of non-
inherently governmental activities (commercial
activities inventories) that are being performed by
government employees. Such activities are suitable
for competitive sourcing or outsourcing. Inherently
governmental functions cannot be competed and
must be performed by the government. 
There are also functions that are not inherently 
governmental, but may (under special conditions)
be considered as such because of the way in which
the contractor performs the contract or the manner
in which the government administers contractor
performance. Examples include services that involve
feasibility, efficiency, and cost analysis; services
that involve reorganization, regulations, and plan-
ning; contractors providing technical evaluation 
of contract proposals or providing assistance in
development of statements of work; and contrac-
tors providing inspection services. 
Under the Clinton administration, OMB estimated
savings of roughly $9.2 billion in DoD operating
costs between 1997 and 2005 and $2.8 billion in
annual recurring savings after 2005 that resulted
from A-76 studies.17 The Bush administration is taking
steps to achieve even larger savings and manage-
ment reforms. They have proposed that (for the
overall federal government) over 400,000 positions
(i.e., 50 percent of all non-inherently governmental
positions identified) should be competitively
sourced by 2005, and agencies are reviewing 
positions to determine their exact number.
Case Studies
1. Road Repair Work in Indianapolis18
In 1992, Mayor Stephen Goldsmith, a believer in
free markets, decided to privatize some of the pub-
lic operations in the city of Indianapolis. To avoid
the expected reaction of the employee unions to
possible layoffs, Goldsmith decided to organize 
a public-private competition instead of firing the
employees precipitously. One issue raised with 
the public-private competition was whether such 
a competition would be fair. A second issue was
the difficulty in determining the full costs of current
public operations. In addition to finding solutions
to these problems, the mayor’s office had to decide
which of the operations (among trash pickup,
wastewater treatment, and street repairs) to initially
compete and how to organize the competition. 
Among several options, filling potholes was chosen
for public-private competition because of its high
public visibility. First, cooperation with the union
and employees was obtained. To provide fair bid-
ding, private sector consultants were brought in to
help public employees prepare bids. Cost determi-
nation was one of the most difficult steps during
the bid preparation. To ensure the highest level of
accuracy, activity-based costing (ABC) was used 
to determine cost figures. Employee timesheets,
interviews to determine the time required for each
task, and market price for the materials were used.
Historical averages were used to estimate the quan-
tity (number of potholes to be filled) in order to
determine total costs. Senior management cost was
not considered, as top management would remain
public to monitor performance. Public employees
prepared a bid of $301 per ton of asphalt put down
after performing detailed studies to decrease the
labor and equipment cost (i.e., to get the MEO).
They cut costs from $407 to $301, a 25 percent
cost reduction.
Only the threat of competition removed some of
the slack that existed as part of the costs of the job.
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Middle managers who were not essential and held
positions used solely for political patronage were
laid off to reduce the cost of management. An inde-
pendent committee was established to evaluate the
bids. However, there was an unexpected problem
in the bidding process: The work to be done was
not adequately described—it was not clear whether
the job was simply to fill in the potholes or repair
the whole road. As a result, there was a vast differ-
ence between the public bids and the lowest private
bid. The work was awarded to the public workers;
and subsequent competitions focused on much
clearer performance specifications.
Conclusions: The threat of competition cut costs 
by 25 percent in this case. Among the initial chal-
lenges were a lack of government cost data and dif-
ficulty in determining the job-based cost. Resistance
was dealt with by cooperating with the union and
by ensuring a level playing field. One of the prob-
lems during competition was a poorly prepared
performance work statement. 
2. The Navy’s Public-Private Competition19
After the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980,
strengthening national defense and increasing gov-
ernment’s reliance on private goods and services
were two of the government’s top priorities. By
1984, the Navy introduced several elements of a
Navy Industrial Improvement Program; the most
important was a program authorized by Congress
in 1984 to test public-private competition for the
Navy’s multibillion-dollar overhaul and repair work.
The Navy’s shipbuilding contractors had cost prob-
lems on new ship constructions because of the
high inflation rates in the 1970s. This was com-
pounded by unrealistic schedules and planning
mistakes, which resulted in an inability to cover
costs. These factors seriously crippled the United
States shipbuilding industry at the end of the
1970s. The Navy’s trend was toward using private
sector capacity more widely; however, the projects
given to the private sector did not have motivating
contracts for the contractors. Also, there was dissat-
isfaction among private shipbuilding employees
because of their lower salaries and benefits com-
pared to those of public employees. Project orders
specified the work to be performed, the anticipated
cost, and schedule of performance; but unlike normal
commercial contracts, these cost-based, percent-of-
cost fee contracts did not specify any incentives 
or penalties to motivate adherence to these terms. 
Consequently, in the 1980s, senior Navy leadership
started to discuss taking advantage of the excess
capacity of the private sector compared to the full
loading of public shipyards. The eight public ship-
yards, five of which were built in the 1800s, were
devoted exclusively to the overhaul and repair of
naval vessels. In 1982, the Undersecretary of the
Department of the Navy commissioned an in-depth
study by a team of two management consulting
firms on how to improve the naval shipyards’ per-
formance and costs. By 1984, most of the team’s
130 recommendations were approved, one of which
was to test the recommendation that the naval ship-
yards be required to compete with the private sector
for scheduled overhaul and repair work. 
The test programs started in 1985. The competition
program not only included overhauls and repairs,
but also ship alterations and the Naval Sea Systems
Command’s Nuclear Propulsion Directorate. In the
test competitions, the contract would not be awarded
simply to the lowest bidder; instead, performance
would also be carefully assessed and both sectors
would be required to submit fixed-price incentive-
fee bids, with a target price and a ceiling price
above which the shipyard would absorb all the
costs. The competition process involved a lot of
learning, especially for the public employees (who
obtained private consultant help in preparing bids),
and for the Navy management (regarding how to
ensure a fair comparison). There were complaints
and investigation requests after the first contracts,
on which the General Accounting Office (GAO)
prepared reports and basically upheld the Navy’s
decisions to award one overhaul to a private yard
and one (at a significantly higher cost) to the public
yard. The Navy then ran a competition for another
ship; a public yard (Charleston) won with a bid of 
$112 million (14 percent less than its previous,
similar overhaul cost of $130 million).
Conclusions: The Navy solved most of its problems
with the naval shipyards and maintenance in the
early 1980s using competitive sourcing based on
best value. The incentives created by the competitive
environment allowed them to achieve both greater
control and significant cost reductions, without 
sacrificing performance.
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3. Services at Fort Rucker Aviation Training
Base
Fort Rucker, the Army’s main aviation training base,
has been using competitive sourcing for its pilot
training and aircraft maintenance services since 
the 1980s. Three examples of the public-private
competitions (described below) brought between
20 and 40 percent savings, with equal or higher
performance. 
• In 1991, the Army competed some of the ser-
vices at its Fort Rucker base using the A-76
process. A large training services unit (providing
audiovisual support to trainers) was contracted
out. Savings from the original baseline were
about 40 percent. The in-house bid would have
produced a savings of 17 percent, although
that was not enough to retain the work. All 72
government employees were retained in place,
though some were downgraded.20
• Another public-private competition at Fort
Rucker was for the director of logistics (for base
support functions that employed about 400
people). It was competed in 1991, about seven
years after the announcement date. The work
remained in-house, and there was a 20 percent
savings from the original baseline cost.21
• A more recent competition22 (in 2001) at Fort
Rucker resulted in contracting out despite some
strong objections. The savings realized were 
30 percent. The Army awarded the company a
$44.6 million contract to perform services at
Fort Rucker, which would eliminate 338 federal
civilian jobs at the base. The employees at the
base urged the Army not to proceed with the
contract award on the grounds that the contrac-
tor’s bid was based on outdated cost estimates
and contractor labor costs. The contractor’s bid
relied on data from 1997, when the base first
started studying whether contractors could per-
form the job at a lower cost. The contractor bid
did not take into account additional services
and new buildings built since then. However,
the contract was awarded, and revisions to cost
calculations made. The private bid came in $10
million under that of the federal workers and,
even after the revisions, the contract was
awarded and the appeal rejected. 
Conclusions: In the recent competitions at Fort
Rucker, the competitions still took two to four
years, and some of the earlier ones took even
longer—primarily to overcome Army, union, and
congressional opposition. Clearly, this time period
needs to be shortened. Nonetheless, the competi-
tions resulted in significant savings in spite of the
process problems.
4. Six DoD Cases Examined by RAND23
RAND examined six competitive sourcing competi-
tions (one for the Army, one for the Navy, and four
for the Air Force) to determine their expected savings,
whether the savings were real and enduring, and
how they were achieved. The expected personnel
cost savings were found to range from 34 percent
to 59 percent of the baseline personnel costs. The
savings were found to be real and enduring for the
three contractor awards. They could not be fully
verified for the three in-house awards (due to the
lack of cost visibility on government full costs). The
cases covered base operating support (2), missile
maintenance (1), aircraft maintenance (2), and
telecommunication maintenance and operations (1).
RAND concluded that the labor savings came from
three major factors:
• Using fewer workers—contributing factors
included civilianization, multiskilling (cross-
training, combining job series), organizational
restructuring, reduced work scope, and labor
availability/increased work intensity
• Downgrading positions and paying lower
wages for lower-skilled jobs
• Capital-labor substitution
These savings were found to be real and enduring.
For the private contractors, the difference between
the contractor bid and the actual contract payment
is a good indicator of whether the savings were
realized as expected. This difference was at most 
a 2.5 percent increase in the payment (and was
actually a decrease of 13 percent in one case). For
the public sector the difference between personnel
slots in the MEO bid and current staffing is an 
indication of whether savings endure over time. 
The differences are small, indicating that savings
endured. To get an actual cost comparison, the
government would need to move to a method
(such as activity-based costing) that would provide
full-cost visibility. 
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5. Organizational and Intermediate
Maintenance of Navy Aircraft24
The Navy competitively sourced its personnel and
equipment for the organizational (O) and interme-
diate (I) level maintenance of the TA-4J aircraft. The
award was made to the private sector. The analyses
of performance and cost data show a 33 percent
reduction in costs at the same level of performance. 
The analysis of cost was done by comparing direct
maintenance man-hours per flight hour (DMMH),
which shows the amount of resources used to com-
plete the task. The performance analysis compared
full mission capable rate (FMC)—the percentage 
of time the aircraft is ready—mission capable rate
(MC)—the percentage of time the aircraft can fly
and complete the mission—and not-mission-
capable rate (NMC)—the percentage of time the
aircraft cannot perform the mission. All three of
these performance measures remained essentially
the same. 
Thus, there is a significant difference between
DMMH (costs) in favor of the contractor, while 
differences between MC, FMC, and NMC rates
(performance measures) are not significant when
the in-house and contractor performance are com-
pared. However, on this program the transition
from in-house to contractor was not well planned
and it took about two years for the contractor to
reach the previous performance of the in-house
workforce. Yet, when the contractor subsequently
turned over the task to another contractor, there
was no such drop in performance as the personnel
stayed the same and only the management changed
in this case—clearly, the initial transition was not
well handled by the Navy.
Finally, since the contractor provided an equivalent
flight hour with a 34 percent reduction in direct
maintenance man-hours (an obvious resource and
cost savings), some of these savings could instead
be used to improve performance even further.
Competition leads to a gain in efficiency. How 
this gain is divided between performance gains 
and cost reductions depends on how the contract 
is written. One other conclusion from this case is
that if the transition period is not smooth, both 
performance and savings can suffer.
6. Defense Finance and Accounting Service
(DFAS) Studies
During the period 1995–2001, DFAS ran nine 
competitive sourcings for a variety of finance and
accounting functions.25 They varied in size from 84
man years to 650 man years—for a baseline total 
of 2,929 man years. The vast majority of these
competitions were won by the in-house MEO. The
savings ranged from 20 percent to 69 percent, with
an average of 32 percent, with seven of the nine
falling in the range of 25 percent to 39 percent.
What is particularly important about these studies
is the fact that when competition is introduced,
even when the award goes to the in-house organi-
zation, there is likely to be a savings in the range 
of 30 percent. 
Aggregated Results of DoD
Competitive Sourcing 
Table 2 summarizes the average expected savings
from DoD competitive sourcing studies completed
(i.e., the comparison between the prior in-house
costs and the winning bid).
Realized savings: There are two studies that exam-
ine the actual (realized) savings from the DoD
competitive sourcings after the work has been 
completed: one from the Center for Naval Analysis
(CNA) and one from RAND.
The CNA study26 on actual realized savings and
their comparison with expected savings is illustrated
in Table 3.
“Effective costs” exclude cost changes that would
have occurred whether or not the function was
competed (such as one-time cost increases caused
by an increase in workload). Thus, comparison of
costs before the competition and the effective costs
after the competition gives a good measure of the
results of competition. Effective costs are 98 per-
cent of expected costs, which shows that expected
costs are generally a good estimation of later real-
ized costs. The “observed” costs include the effects
of added workloads and scope. It is observed that
even with this added work, there was still a 24 per-
cent savings relative to the in-house baseline with-
out the added work.
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Analysis of Case Results
For the competitive sourcing initiatives described
above, the average savings of the cases is 33 per-
cent—and the savings are expected to be between
25 percent and 43 percent, 95 percent of the time.
Also, for those limited cases where performance
improvements were quantified, the performance
improvement averaged 109 percent. 
To achieve an optimum implementation strategy, 
it is important to define the Performance Work
Statement, or PWS, clearly and completely. A suc-
cessful example is the application in DFAS: intro-
ducing a two-team and three-stage methodology to
PWS and MEO development, establishing a new
process to enhance and potentially speed up com-
petition, instituting an executive steering group to
provide oversight, and involving all DFAS business
partners in the process. The strategies were seen to
be effective in making the process less complicated
and effective.27
Effects of Competitive Sourcing on
the Workforce
One of the greatest concerns about competitive
sourcing is that no matter who wins—the public or
private sector—there will be a significant number
of public employees forced out of work. In con-
trast, actual results show that the number of civil
employees laid off is in the single-digit percentages,
even when the private sector wins. A GAO study28
examining the effects of competitive sourcing ini-
tiatives on the workforce for three large competitive
sourcing cases (with one in-house win and two
contractor wins) found that very few of the employ-
ees were involuntarily separated (only 8 percent),
while the actual government workforce reduction
was quite significant (1,079 military were reas-
signed, and 348 civilian positions remained from
the original 1,111 civilian positions). The remaining
civilians were either transferred (27 percent) or vol-
untarily retired or separated (65 percent). The study
also found that 26 percent of those who voluntarily
separated or retired took jobs with the contractor. 
Savings
Time period Agency Number of Competitions Expected Effective Observed
1988–1996 DoD 16 35% 34% 24%
Table 3: Actual Realized Savings from CNA study
Average  
Time period Agency Number of Competitions Percent Savings Source
1995–1998 DoD total 53 42% GAO report Jan. 1999
1994–1998 Air Force 44 42% CNA report Nov. 1998
1994–1998 Navy 3 37% CNA report Nov. 1998
1995–2000 DFAS 9 (2,929 FTEs) 32% DFAS report 2000
1975–2001 DoD total 2,287 (98,348 FTEs) 33% CNA report 2001
1997–2001 Army 105 (10,791 FTEs) 39% Department of Army
report 2001
1998 DoD 5 (1,840 FTEs) 47% RAND report 2000
Table 2: Average Expected Savings from DoD Competitive Sourcing Studies
23
MOVING TOWARD MARKET-BASED GOVERNMENT
An earlier CNA study found that DoD personnel
programs were very effective in minimizing invol-
untary job loss. Even though 40 percent of the
employees at depot facilities were targeted for
Reduction in Force (RIF)—involuntary separation—
many found other jobs through DoD job placement
services, some voluntarily retired, and others vol-
untarily separated to take jobs with the winning
contractor. As a result, only 3.4 percent were actu-
ally RIFed.29
Findings from Competitive Sourcing
Initiatives
1. Trend of savings: When the historical trends of
overall DoD-expected savings from competitive
sourcing between 1975 and 2001 are exam-
ined, it is evident that savings are increasing
with the improvement in implementation;30
specifically, average savings before 1994 are
around 31 percent, while average savings from
competitions since then are around 42 percent.
Similarly, a Department of the Army (DA) inde-
pendent study found that, for these same time 
periods, savings improved significantly—from
28 percent to 39 percent. 
2. Performance improvements: Performance is
found to improve, or at least stay the same,
after the competitions (as long as this is a con-
sideration in the process). Note that in some
cases implementation during the transition
period is somewhat problematic because of
lack of training and support. This results in per-
formance being lower during the first year
compared to subsequent years. 
3. Average time to complete studies (competi-
tions) decreased over time: Average time to
complete competitions declined from 51
months before 1994 to 18 months for single
functions, and 30 months for multiple func-
tions.31 The decline in completion time con-
tributed to implementation effectiveness and
the increasing trend in percent savings.
However, it is still far too long.
4. Percent contractor wins increased over time:
Between 1978 and 1994, roughly half of com-
petitions were won by private sector contrac-
tors, while for competitions held after 1995,
about 60 percent were won by contractors.32
5. Winners: Savings from contracting decisions
(i.e., private sector awards) are generally higher
than in-house decisions, as seen in Table 4. How-
ever, savings from both public and private sec-
tor wins are significant, and getting larger with
learning.
6. Savings/size relationship: As shown in Table 5,
average savings are significantly larger for bigger
competitions; yet they are still important even
for small ones. The percent savings and savings
per personnel billet increase noticeably as the
size of the function increases.33
Although average percent savings are smaller
for the very small competitions, and regula-
tions don’t obligate competition (especially for
1–10 billets), 82 percent of studies completed
had less than 45 billets, and 73 percent had
less than 25 billets.34 In DoD between 1978
and 1994, half the competitions were for 14 
or fewer positions.35 Notice also (from Table 5)
that while average savings are still significant,
small competitions are more likely to produce
no savings than are large competitions; and the
larger ones (over 250 people) will always have
savings. 
Finally, although A-76 processes are not nor-
mally required for functions with 10 or fewer
Strengths and Weaknesses of
Competitive Sourcing
Strengths 
• Competitive sourcing introduces competition
(vs. prior monopoly), which promises to raise
performance and significantly lower costs.
• Competitive sourcing allows historic govern-
ment workforce an opportunity to bid to retain
the work (vs. outsourcing or privatization).
Weaknesses
• The current process (A-76) is both time-con-
suming and expensive—as well as very com-
plex (and not based on “best value”).
• Competitive sourcing will have an impact on
government workforce (both in morale and in
limited involuntary separations).
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personnel, one study36 found that 858 functions
(around 40 percent of all the competitions in
that database) with 1–10 personnel were com-
peted using the full A-76 process. Clearly, this
was both expensive and time consuming, but
may have been the only way (politically) to get
it done. 
7. Savings/number of bidders relationship: This is
an area of some controversy, since one RAND
study37 found that competition effectiveness
was greatest when there were a few very quali-
fied bidders (e.g., 3–6), and it fell off as the
numbers became very large. Another study38
(by CNA) found that savings continue to
increase with the number of bidders, and as
the number of bidders gets larger (after around
17 bidders), the increase slows down. However,
in the CNA study the median number of 
bidders was four, so the data may not be too
inconsistent (although this is an area requiring
further research). Clearly there have been many
examples of fierce competition when there
were only two bidders for a significant contract
(for example, for the DoD purchase of jet
engines).41
8. Sustaining savings: Multiple studies found that
savings from A-76 competitions were sustained
over time. Nine of the 14 competitions ana-
lyzed by CNA (where data existed) showed no
significant increase in realized (“effective”)
costs over the first solicitation period bids.42
Similarly, a RAND study43 found that savings
are endured over time. (Evidence of sustained
savings was more apparent for the cases where
the private sector won because the costs were
measurable; but the head counts for the public
sector ended close to the MEO’s bid, so it is
believed that the costs were sustained).
9. A credible threat of competition can result in 
significant (about 20–25 percent) savings: One
example is competition of road repair work in
Indianapolis. In-house cost was decreased eas-
ily by 25 percent while preparing the bid. Also,
according to bidding behavior simulation,44 22
percent savings are expected if no contractor
bidding is actually performed, but only if the
in-house team is facing the threat of competi-
tion. This indicates the effect of maintaining a
credible potential for competition on savings,
as well as the existence of slack (easily remov-
able extra costs) as big as 22 percent (on aver-
age) for the non-competed, in-house functions.
10. Savings by function: When savings by function
group are analyzed,45 savings are found to be
significantly higher for research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) support functions
Average Percent
Size (number Total Percent with 0 
of personnel) Studies Savings39 Savings40
1 to 10 796 22% 37%
11 to 30 633 29% 14%
31 to 45 142 32%
46 to 75 94 30%
76 to 100 42 34% 3%
101 to 150 4%
151 to 200 9%
201 to 250 5%
>251 0%
Total 1774 34%







Time Period Agency of Competitions Decision Savings Source
1978–1994 DoD 2,131 (82,000 FTEs) Contractor 40% CNA report
In-house 20%
1997–2001 DA 105 (10,291 FTEs) Contractor 51% DA report 2001
In-house 22%
Table 4: Savings from Contracting Decisions
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(69 percent), followed by real property mainte-
nance, installation services, and intermediate
maintenance. Essentially, the more a process
can be “reengineered” for productivity gains,
the greater the savings potential from competi-
tion. But even simple functions show gains as a
result of the competitive pressure.
11. Effect on Government Workforce: A number of
studies have shown that the effect of competi-
tive sourcing on the government workforce is
considerably less than has been expected. In
fact, even when the winner of the competition
is the private sector (replacing the prior govern-
ment performers), the involuntary separations
are in single-digit percentages. The vast major-
ity of the government workers have either
found other government work or gone to work
for the contractor. 
Recommendations 
1. Establish an effective training system to:
• Inform government managers that increased
efficiency does not mean decreased effective-
ness, and that the target of the reforms is to
improve both effectiveness and efficiency. 
• Inform managers in developing Performance
Work Statements and Most Efficient
Organizations. 
• Inform managers to make better cost estimations,
and assessments of actual costs and savings.
2. Establish a system to facilitate tracking cost
and performance. Cost information should be
presented using an appropriate (and consistent)
activity-based accounting method that considers
all relevant costs. Government management
should be able to isolate a particular unit or
activity within government and identify all rea-
sonable costs associated with that activity. This
is important for establishing a level playing field
for industry and government competition com-
parisons—as well as for post-award tracking.
3. Build an independent research unit. There is
an urgent need to collect data and analyze
realized savings as well as other effects of com-
petitions. This data and analysis, which is criti-
cal for making effective strategic decisions, is
largely missing today.
4. Create incentives and alignment of goals with
mission. As for every organizational reform,
leadership and support from all levels of 
management are critical for a successful com-
petitive sourcing effort. To ensure support,
management should align goals of the program
with the organization’s mission. 
5. Subject in-house wins to recompetition every
five years if performance or cost standards are
not met (as is done with private sector wins).
The option of competition should always be
kept open.
6. Make comparisons, but trade off performance
against cost. Choose the party offering “best
value” instead of merely choosing the lowest
bidder. 
7. Shift to a Federal Acquisition Regulation-based
approach, which will be fairer than the current
A-76 process as all parties will compete under
the same set of well-known rules. According to
GAO observations, most of the appeals after
the competitive bidding process are related to
compliance with A-76 regulations.46
8. Shorten the competition time. The requirement
should be to complete the process in less than
12 months—outsourcing the award if it takes
longer. To achieve this shortened cycle will
undoubtedly require process simplification 
(an obviously desirable feature, in any case).
9. Limit the process to functions that have more
than 10 billets. Competing larger projects/jobs
brings more savings than competing smaller
ones for which the long and costly competitive
sourcing process may not be worth the results. 
10. Require senior leadership approval to cancel
competitions. Cancellations deteriorate savings
a great deal and discourage future bidders.
(Note that when a competition is cancelled,
there is no requirement for the in-house 
organization to implement the MEO.) 
11. Bundle similar and small functions in one
competition. Bundling similar functions
increases the size of the competition (and thus
increases savings) and attracts more qualified
and a larger number of bidders. More impor-
tantly, bundling similar functions creates 
synergy from reengineering, and increases 
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efficiency and effectiveness by enabling better
utilization of workforce, cross training, and
multitasking. Additionally, to address the issue
of small business involvement, contractors
competing should be obligated to have a cer-
tain percentage (around 20 percent) of their
subcontracts as small businesses. 
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Definition
Privatization is the process of transferring an exist-
ing public entity or enterprise to private ownership.
It can be done with or without competition. It dif-
fers from “outsourcing” in that the management
and the workforce—and often the equipment and
facilities—remain the same as before, except that
they are now private employees (and private equip-
ment and facilities); it differs from “competitive
sourcing” in that there is no option of the work
staying in the government. 
Various Forms
• Full privatization: A government agency is sold
completely, including all the capital assets as
well as the transfer of the workforce. The prop-
erty, employees, and management are all private.
• Partial privatization: The equipment and facility
remain government-owned but the workforce 
is privatized (i.e., government-owned and con-
tractor-operated). This can also be considered a
form of public-private partnership.
• “Privatization-in-place”: The work remains at
the prior facility, and can be both “full” privati-
zation (i.e., labor and equipment), or “partial”
privatization (i.e., labor only). This arrangement
preserves jobs and may guarantee workload,
although civil servants transition to contract
labor. Kelly Air Force Base and McClellan Air
Force Base are two examples of privatization-
in-place, and are explained in Case 4 below.
• Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP):47 This
is a form of full privatization. In these initiatives,
the operation is transferred to a private firm
owned by the former government employees.
The employees essentially transform govern-
mental services into a profit-making ESOP
company (among other forms, ESOPs can also
be nonprofit, or linked in partnerships with a
private firm). These ESOPs provide former gov-
ernment workers with the opportunities that a
new business can offer, and enable a smooth
transition from government employment. But
while an ESOP may develop worker support for
privatization, it is not a preferred model of pri-
vatization in that unless the former government
service is in real demand in the open market,
the model lacks the element of competition.
The privatization of the Office of Personnel
Management’s Background Investigation Unit 
is an example of an ESOP, which is explained
in Case 1 below. 
• Transitional Benefit Corporation Model (TBC)48:
The TBC model transfers underutilized govern-
ment assets to the private sector, allowing for
more efficient use of real estate, equipment,
and even intellectual property. The TBC model
occurs under the legal and business framework
of a nonprofit umbrella structure, which 
oversees the gradual transfer of government
employees and property to the private sector.
The TBC model is beneficial in that it allows
government employees to retain their public
benefits, while improving costs and efficiency
through the maximum utilization of workload
and assets. However, like the ESOP, the TBC
does not have the benefit of competition during
the transfer process; therefore, incentives to
Privatization
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improve costs and performance are present
only when the TBC competes for additional
work in the outside marketplace.
Case Studies
1. Office of Personnel Management’s
Background Investigation Unit ESOP49
Federal agencies rely on the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) to conduct background inves-
tigations and training. In response to a decision 
to close its Background Investigation Unit, OPM
proposed to privatize that operation through an
employee stock ownership program, or ESOP. Since
there is also a strong commercial market in this
business, the ESOP had to become competitive.
This effort has saved OPM over $75 million during
its first five years.50 In addition, the employees have
received bonuses and stock options. The transition
was transparent to the using agencies. 
OPM used a sole-source, three-year contract (with 
two options years) initially to help ensure that the
U.S. Investigations Services, Inc. (USIS) got off to 
a good start. USIS was awarded the contract again
in 1998, and also entered into a contract with DoD
for $200 million. By bringing in commercial busi-
ness, USIS has continued to grow, with over 1,000
employees in 2000. The ESOP shares were recently
bought by an investment firm for $545 million,
which will be distributed among the 3,600 current
employees, 1,400 former employees, and other
shareholders.
Conclusion: The investigation unit of OPM was a
good candidate for an ESOP-type privatization as
the services it provides are in demand outside of
government. The potential of the privatized organi-
zation to be a strong commercial enterprise in the
competitive market is one of the criteria for decid-
ing which federal organizations are good candidates
for an ESOP. 
2. Indianapolis International Airport51
As a result of falling revenues and increased
expenses, the Airport Authority Board looked for
better ways to manage the Indianapolis airport sys-
tem. They resolved that through privatization they
could cut operating costs, improve customer service,
attract added revenue to the airports, and make the
airport more competitive with lower per-passenger
costs. In 1995, the Airport Authority chose a private
contractor after receiving several proposals. The
contractor hired the full airport staff and estimated
that the costs of operating the airport would fall by
25 percent (without any performance reduction).
The agreement made Indianapolis International
Airport one of the largest privately managed airports
in the United States.
Conclusion: During the first year of operations, the
contractor was able to decrease the per-passenger
cost from an average of $6.70 to $3.87. This savings,
along with a 50 percent increase in per-passenger
concessions and parking revenue, led the airport 
to reduce landing fees by 70 percent. A reduction
in landing fees will benefit the city by potentially
attracting more business to the airport, meeting
their goal of making the airport more competitive in
the region. After seven years of managing the airport,
the contractor generated $34 million in non-airline
revenue. Rather than charging the airlines more 
for the use of the airport, the contractor generated
money for the airport through increased food, retail,
and cargo sales.52
3. British Telecom: An International
Privatization Case53
Great Britain’s efforts to privatize British Telecom
(BT) in the 1980s involved a publicity campaign 
to counter public and employee opposition. This
campaign promoted the purchase of shares in the
denationalized company by small investors and BT
employees.54 In 1984, BT was publicly sold—nearly
2 million people attempted to purchase shares—
with 90 percent of their employees purchasing
shares.
This privatization resulted in significant perfor-
mance improvements. Long waiting lists for phone
installation were eliminated, the number of public
phones increased by 83 percent after 15 years,55
and the call-failure rate of 1 in 25 was improved 
to 1 in 200 (an 800 percent improvement). In addi-
tion to these improvements in customer service,
privatization still allowed BT to fulfill the require-
ment of maintaining costly emergency phone needs
and public phones in rural communities. The gov-
ernment allowed BT to introduce pricing that was
based on the competitive market, with adjustments
for maintenance costs and reasonable profit. 
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One of the reasons for the success of the BT priva-
tization was the element of competition introduced
by government regulation, as well as license
requirements for increased performance. Once pri-
vatization was realized, with the significant number
of citizen and employee stockholders, reversing the
process was not politically feasible. This successful
case of privatization in Britain provided the neces-
sary incentive for the rest of Europe to follow suit.
The results of privatization in 1998 were notice-
able; in Western Europe, countries with competitive
telecommunications have local business rates that
are 27 percent lower than in monopoly countries;
calls to the United States from Western Europe
average 22 percent lower with international com-
petition allowed; and Internet costs are 34 percent
lower in countries with competition.56 Thus, even
with criticisms of competition being slow to start
(BT did not compete in an open market until seven
years after competing in a duopoly), the benefits 
of competition are measurable for consumers.  
4. Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases57
Privatization-in-place was employed by the Air
Force as a remedy for excess labor and facilities at
Air Logistics Centers attempting to avoid job losses
while increasing efficiency. Previously, Air Logistics
Centers were operating at less than 50 percent
capacity. As a result, the Base Realignment and
Closure Commission (BRAC) recommended closure
of these facilities. Instead, President Clinton decided
to privatize these centers at the Kelly and McClellan
Air Force Bases, allowing the more than 25,000
civilian employees to stay on as private employees.
This decision to use privatization-in-place served to
avoid politically sensitive layoffs while still main-
taining surge capacity for emergency situations (as
long as the excess capacity is funded, or if the pri-
vatized facility is able to bring in other work). 
A GAO study58 estimated that the potential savings
from the logistics center closures could be as high
as $206 million, well above the savings of $70 mil-
lion estimated by the BRAC. The GAO study based
that estimate on the assumption that the closing
depots’ work would be transferred to the three
remaining Air Force depots, since the privatization-
in-place plan does not solve the excess capacity
problem at the other depots. The GAO estimated
that the greater savings resulting from the transfer
of work will occur when the remaining depots
reduce excess capacity from 46 percent to 8 per-
cent, economies of scale and other efficiencies 
are employed, and the hourly rates of those at the
receiving locations are lowered by an average of
$6. But even given these GAO figures, privatization-
in-place was considered a more attractive option
than the full transfer of work to another facility, con-
sidering the political ramifications of the latter. Also,
even if the work had been transferred, it would still
be performed without any competition (i.e., on a
monopoly basis by the government). However, with
the privatization approach, if the contractor per-
formed poorly or costs rose, the government could
then run a competition for its work, allowing other
private or government sources to bid.
Recent contracts indicate that in these two cases
the privatization-in-place plans were successful.
Two contracts, worth a combined $11.8 billion,
were competitively won for work performed out of
Kelly by private companies working in partnerships
with the Tinker and Hill Air Force Bases.59 The Air
Force expects that overall savings from the consoli-
dation of depot work will be worth $2.6 billion
over the course of roughly 15 years.60 However,
because of the success of the privatized depots,
concerns remain about the “50-50” law imposed
by Congress to ensure that only 50 percent of
depot work is contracted out, as it hinders the Air
Force from operating with efficiency and flexibility. 
5. Naval Air Warfare Center Takeover by the
City of Indianapolis61
In the mid-1990s, a series of base closures nation-
wide galvanized Indianapolis officials to work to
save the 2,800 jobs at the Indianapolis Naval Air
Warfare Center (NAWC), a large contributor to the
local economy. In a solution that benefited the city,
the workers, and the Navy, city officials decided to
competitively contract with a private firm to oper-
ate the center, bringing in outside work in addition
to performing the services needed by the Navy. The
deal allowed the jobs to remain in the city, but
technically skilled workers would be private rather
than government employees. This is an example of
partial privatization, where the civilian workforce
becomes a private workforce under the new con-
tractor, but remains in the government-owned facility;
and the contractor is free to add new capital equip-
ment (over which it will retain ownership). 
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Results: Because 98 percent of the original NAWC
employees chose to work for the new contractor,
there was a smooth transition in providing the ser-
vices that the Navy required. In addition, the cost
savings planned will greatly benefit the Navy; the
contractor has committed to reducing the rates it
charges the Navy by 15 percent over the next five
years. After that time, the company will have to
compete with other firms for Navy contracts to
ensure that costs remain low.
As for the city of Indianapolis, the privatization
move allowed it to keep the jobs important for 
the local economy, and the contractor planned to
increase employment at the site to 3,000 by 2002.
The city also receives more than $3 million annu-
ally in taxes on property that was previously tax-
exempt. Thus the plan at NAWC enabled a skilled
workforce to keep their jobs, performing additional
work in the private sector while providing the pub-
lic sector with lower cost services.
6. United States Enrichment Corporation
(USEC)
In the 1940s, the United States government created
the United States Enrichment Program (in the public
sector) for the provision of enriched uranium for
nuclear weapons. In 1996, Congress passed the
USEC Privatization Act, which required that the
United States Enrichment Corporation would be
sold either to a third party or as a public offering.
The act established four criteria necessary for the
sale: the United States Treasury would receive the net
present value of USEC; USEC would be protected
against foreign ownership; protections would be in
place for public health, security, and the environ-
ment; and domestic utility industry demands would 
be reasonably met. To satisfy these criteria and to
ensure that the privatization process was accom-
plished in the best public interest, the Treasury 
coordinated the input from government agencies,
outside financial advisors, bidders, unions, and
other affected parties. After the consultation process,
the Treasury decided on the public offering, which
was expected to result in fewer layoffs, less initial
debt, and higher proceeds.62
Results: The public offering of USEC resulted in a
net revenue for the government of $1.38 billion,
with 100 million shares offered at a price of $14.25
per share.63 The Treasury continued to monitor the
company through a “post-closing” agreement,
which limited layoffs, plant closings, and executive
compensation for the two years following the sale.
The government also remained involved with the
company after the sale through the investment of
research and development (R&D) funds to aid in
research to lower production costs, ensuring that
the company would be better able to compete with
foreign companies.64 By 2000, the Treasury testified
before Congress that it was satisfied with the sale
and the status of USEC and had decided to remove
its extensive oversight and allow the company to
function as a fully private entity.
Lessons Learned and
Recommendations
1. Privatization introduces savings and quality
improvements (as long as competition is main-
tained). Expected savings from the cases ranged
from 15 to 25 percent and, for the limited
cases that have been analyzed, the savings
were, in fact, realized. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of
Privatization
Strengths 
• If competition is introduced, customers receive
better prices and higher performance for private
services formerly provided by government
monopolies.
• Government assets can be converted into 
revenue through sales to private firms.
• Excess capacity of government facilities can be
addressed through privatization-in-place, main-
taining jobs and, if competition is introduced,
using facilities more effectively.
Weaknesses
• Where there were once public monopolies, 
privatization may produce private monopolies,
not competition.
• Governments can maintain control over newly
privatized firms, preventing open market 
competition.
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2. Competition is key. Expected savings from
sole-source privatization are lower than savings
from privatization with competition for the
award. Privatization with subsequent competi-
tion is expected to yield significantly more 
savings and performance improvements.
3. Privatize services in demand. Agencies that
provide services that are in demand in both 
the public and private sectors, such as the
investigative services of OPM, are good candi-
dates for privatization (and for building ESOPs).
The newly private entity should be self-sustain-
ing, and should not need the government to
subsidize it in order to stay afloat.65
4. Consider change management issues. It is
important in cases where the government’s
existing workforce is retained under new 
(private sector) management (such as ESOPs 
or privatization-in-place) to give special con-
sideration to change management and compet-
itive incentives, as culture clash is likely.
Private consultants can be used in implement-
ing and establishing change.
5. Government should strictly maintain open
market competition and fair prices after 
privatization occurs. The British Telecom priva-
tization was a big success, with the help of
supportive regulations; other European govern-
ments that failed to maintain a truly competi-
tive market after privatizing services were less
successful. One of the government’s principal
roles in the implementation of privatization is
to make and enforce the rules and regulations
that keep the market open and competitive.
6. Government needs to monitor (but not con-
trol) newly privatized entities to ensure full
public benefit. The Treasury practiced continu-
ous oversight of the United States Enrichment
Corporation for the two years following the
sale to ensure that it remained a benefit to the
public. The government invested R&D funds 
to help the company in the competitive enrich-
ment market. However, after two years, the
Treasury reached the decision to allow the
company to act fully private, in contrast to
some of the European models in which the
government remained intertwined with the 
private company.
7. Privatization-in-place allows addition of pri-
vate work to lower costs of public work. The
privatization of the Indianapolis Naval Air
Warfare Center demonstrated how a contractor
could utilize skilled former Navy employees 
for private enterprise, which enabled the firm
to commit to charging lower rates to the Navy. 
8. Privatization of assets and operations that are
not inherently governmental can result in
large revenues for the public. Private firms
worldwide are able to enrich uranium and
make a profit. With no justifiable reason for 
the United States government to perform such
work, the Treasury was able to bring in $1.38
billion in revenue from the sale of USEC. Other
government assets (like helium) offer similar
possibilities for privatization revenue. 
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Definition
Public-private partnerships (PPP), also referred to 
as public-private ventures, allow the public and
private sectors to share the costs, risks, benefits,
and profits. Public-private partnerships take many
forms, between the range of fully public and fully
private operations.66 In PPP initiatives, production
work, facilities management, and the investment of
capital are functions that can be shared between
public and private entities to obtain efficiency and
cost savings. One of the key elements of a PPP is
the allocation of risks between the public and pri-
vate sectors. When using other strategies, the gov-
ernment assumes only recipient risks; in PPPs, it
has to assume both recipient and sourcing risks.
When used appropriately, PPPs can enable the gov-
ernment to take advantage of privately owned infra-
structure, technology, financing, or capabilities. To
be truly effective, a PPP must operate in a competi-
tive environment; otherwise the incentives for high
performance at low cost will be missing. 
Private Financing
Private financing is the use of private funds (rather
than public funds) to provide a public good. Private
financing, as a form of public-private partnership, is
utilized by government entities to enlist the invest-
ment of private firms in order to afford to finance 
a project. The firm benefits from the partnership
with revenue from the project, and the government
benefits in various ways: sharing the revenue,
decreasing its costs, and having the facility or ser-
vice offered by the private firm available. The VA
Medical Center took advantage of private financing
to construct a needed energy facility (Case 3), as
did the state of Virginia in authorizing the construc-
tion of a private toll road to ease traffic congestion
(Case 4).
Case Studies
1. Army Partnerships: Three Cases 
In 2002, the Army considered a more effective use
of its valuable property through public-private part-
nerships. Army repair depots were operating at 77
percent capacity, and the Army had to increase its
budget for the depots by 34 percent from FY 2002
to FY 2003.67 The Army planned to focus its person-
nel only on tasks essential to war-fighting, and to
privatize those functions that are non-essential to
the mission or that detract from the mission, such
as property maintenance. The Army estimated that
it could save over $600 million a year by moving
many of the approximately 11,000 civilian and mil-
itary depot personnel into private jobs, and from
the for-profit use of the excess capacity of their
facilities.68 Partnerships with private firms already
existed at the Red River, Tobyhanna, and Anniston
Army Depots.
The results of a RAND study69 in 2002 found that
the Army could improve its “readiness posture” by
removing the distraction of maintenance from its
war focus. Additionally, facilities would be better
prepared in the case of emergency, because the
Army could not afford the upgrade money, and pri-
vate investment in the maintenance of these facili-
ties could improve them. The study recommended
that the Army use its property to save costs and
Public-Private Partnerships 
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attract revenue by converting its five repair depots
into entities called Federal Government Corporations
(FGCs). These FGCs would operate with the 
flexibility of a private company regarding their
finances, personnel, and other operations; however,
they would need to balance that flexibility with
congressional oversight in order to be effective and
to address inevitable political concerns.70
Aberdeen Test Center
The Army plans to open Aberdeen Test Center
(ATC) in Maryland to outside academic and private
entities for research use, and estimates savings of
$1 million to $3 million per year in revenues.71 The
partnership, referred to as the National Testing,
Training and Technology Company (NT3C), will be
set up by 2004 if the Army and Congress complete
authorizing legislation. NT3C will be a “limited 
liability company” with private and academic part-
ners, enabling the partners to share liability through
the pooling of their capital and expertise.72 The
potential partners the ATC is pursuing are those
interested in testing vehicle and communication
products. 
Currently, the ATC operates with 25 percent of its
funding from the Army and 75 percent from test
customers. By forming this new company, the ATC
hopes to continue to obtain private funding needed
to maintain a state-of-the-art test facility for optimum
military tests. The private uses of the facility will also
help to lower overhead costs and offer the highly
skilled workforce more frequent testing experience.
Of course, it will have to offer competitive prices
and performance to attract private activities.
Sharing Production at Anniston and Letterkenny
Depots73
In 1997, the Anniston Depot partnered with a pri-
vate firm to upgrade 62 Fox reconnaissance vehi-
cles.74 The company used the depot for production,
and then paid the depot for tasks such as welding,
grinding, cleaning, and painting. As of 1998, the
depot had received $1 million for work done on
the first eight vehicles. According to depot person-
nel, the partnership has also resulted in lower total
costs for the combined work while the core depot
capabilities remained intact; and the contractor
invested $450,000 in facility upgrades. 
In 1993, a work-sharing partnership was also
developed at Letterkenny Army Depot to efficiently
construct the Paladin, a self-propelled Howitzer. 
By using government facilities and contractor com-
ponents, $15 million in savings resulted, as well as
$3.4 million in contractor investments to renovate
the facilities. 
Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support
(ARMS) Act75
In 1992, the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing
Support (ARMS) Act authorized the Army to invest
funds in its ammunitions plants in order to attract
private tenants. The ARMS Act predicted that by
repairing, refurbishing, and upgrading ammunitions
plants, the Army would be able to reduce mainte-
nance costs, create jobs, and encourage private use
of the facilities while retaining core manufacturing
capabilities. 
Results: Between 1993 and 1999, the government
saved $103 million and 5,133 jobs were created as
a result of the ARMS program. The number of tenant
employees, 90 percent of whom are commercial,
grew by 30 percent from 1994 to1999. There are
still concerns about the program regarding the
unclear roles and responsibilities between the pub-
lic and private partners in the management of the
Army ammunition plants. Additionally, some of the
facilities discontinued the ARMS program before
the benefits could be realized. Overall, though, it is
clear that the program has succeeded in lowering
facility costs, encouraging more private tenants,
creating jobs, and bringing in revenue to cover the
costs of facility improvements.
2. Indianapolis Wastewater Treatment (White
River Environmental Partnership)76
In the early 1990s, the city of Indianapolis had to
deal with tremendous deficits and impending infra-
structure improvement costs for its water system. To
handle these issues, city officials decided to develop
a public-private partnership; a private organization
would manage the two publicly owned Advanced
Wastewater Treatment (AWT) facilities that served
the city. In 1993, the city signed a contract with the
White River Environmental Partnership (WREP), a
consortium of three companies, one of which was
the parent company to the Indianapolis Water
Company. Knowing that it was the first major city
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to contract wastewater facilities, the city used inde-
pendent consultants to carefully plan and conduct
the competitive bidding process before the WREP
was chosen.
Results: By 1999, the WREP partnership had gener-
ated over $72 million in savings for the city. WREP
reduced staff levels from 328 in 1993 to 157 in
1998. In anticipation of layoffs, the city transferred
67 of the staff to other city jobs, 43 found jobs
through an outplacement system funded by the
WREP, 10 found jobs on their own, and five retired
(there is no information on the remaining 46 employ-
ees laid off). The union admits that the environment
for members at the AWT facilities has improved;
wages and benefits are 9 to 28 percent higher than
for other city employees, accidents are down 84
percent, and grievances are fewer. Performance 
has also improved as water quality violations have
fallen 86 percent; thus, the WREP exceeded city
performance measurements. Due to the success of
this partnership, the city granted the WREP a 10-
year extension to the contract in 1997, projecting
future savings of $189 million as a result of the
move away from city management.
3. VA Medical Center, Mountain Home,
Tennessee77
In an effort to take advantage of its property 
holdings to attract revenue, the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) developed an enhanced-use
leasing arrangement whereby private firms could
finance, develop, manage, and profit from VA prop-
erty. This arrangement was authorized in 1991 and,
since then, has enabled the VA to enter into PPPs
involving diverse projects, including office build-
ings, senior residential facilities, homeless shelters,
and health care support facilities. This lease allows
for private investment and use of VA properties 
in return for various benefits such as a share of 
revenue, services, and facility use, All proceeds
related to the lease, after costs are reimbursed, go
straight into medical care appropriations; this cre-
ates incentives for managers to make the most 
productive use of property in order to improve the
core functions of the agency.
In 2001, the VA opened the Mountain Home Energy
Center, a facility financed, developed, and operated
by a private contractor to provide energy for the 
James H. Quillen VA Medical Center and for non-
VA customers. The facility was designed not only 
to meet the regular energy needs of the VA, but also
to meet 100 percent of its emergency power needs,
an improvement over its previous capabilities. The
lease requires fixed terms for the VA to purchase
energy for 35 years; yet there was built-in flexibility
allowing the VA to adjust for future needs. Overall,
the partnership resulted in savings for the VA of $35
million, with $11.5 million in discounted recurring
costs and $17.5 million in life-cycle costs. The pri-
vate lessee was to profit by selling excess energy to
non-VA customers, and the VA would receive a per-
centage of that revenue, estimated at $5 million.  
4. Dulles Greenway
The concept of a privately financed toll road devel-
oped in response to increasing strain on current
highways and a lack of state resources to improve
them. The states authorized the creation of these
roads by transferring control over the property and
rights of the private entity to collect tolls, generally
for a temporary period of time. This transaction bal-
ances risk between public and private entities.78 In
the late 1980s, the state of Virginia faced a $7 bil-
lion deficit for transportation needs, yet it needed
to build a highway to give residents of Loudoun
County access to expanding employment opportu-
nities located in northern Virginia and Washington,
D.C. To solve this problem, the state authorized the
development of private toll roads in 1988, and by
1990, granted the partnership Trip II the authority
to build the Dulles Greenway, a completely private
venture that would be returned to public ownership
in 2036.
The Dulles Greenway is a 14.1-mile extension to
the state-owned Dulles Toll Road. It opened in
1995 as the first private toll road to be built in the
state since 1816, and one of the first national roads
to be financed, built, and operated with private
money since the 19th century. When the road
opened September 1995, ridership was a disap-
pointment; only about 10,500 vehicles per day
used the extension after the first six months.79 The
project originally estimated ridership based on the
economic growth of the late 1980s, and did not
include the proper level of risk when developing its
financing plan, thus causing serious financial prob-
lems with much lower than expected revenue.80 As
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a result, the project barely met operating costs, and
by 1996, Greenway owners began to default on
their loans and were on the verge of bankruptcy.
Rather than acting as a partner to support this proj-
ect, the state expanded a free road competing for
ridership, and state officials were said to be
ambivalent about the private project.81
In 1999, the project received a private refinancing
package of $360 million in insured bonds, and 
was able to repay its initial creditors and expand
the road. Ridership then quadrupled from 10,500
weekday commuters in 1995 to nearly 44,000 by
1999.82 With this increase in ridership along with
an increase in toll charges (except for passengers
using the electronic system), the project was able
to afford expansion. Without needing state money
to finance the project, the Greenway was able—
with private financing—to complete the first five
miles of a six-lane widening project in 2001.83
Lessons Learned and
Recommendations
1. Competition is critical. Once again, incentives
are required to create the motivation for a PPP
to achieve lower costs and higher performance
(otherwise, it is simply a public-private
monopoly).
2. Significant savings and increased revenues
result. Examples demonstrate the savings to
public services, lower-cost facility maintenance,
and decreased excess capacity, as well as rev-
enues resulting from PPPs. 
3. Performance improvements can result. The
WREP partnership in Indianapolis improved
water standards, by multiple measures, over
the previous city management. The Mountain
Home Energy Center provided the VA Medical
Center with 100 percent of its emergency
energy needs. 
4. Underutilized, costly-to-maintain facilities are
potentially valuable assets for PPP initiatives.
The Army now recognizes that its depots and
ammunitions plants, which are both valuable
and underutilized, can operate at lower costs
and greater capacity with the influx of private
tenants and production. The VA developed
enhanced-use leases to make more productive
use of its property assets and to raise funds for
its core functions. 
5. Balance is needed between government over-
sight and flexible, local control over initiatives.
Partnerships can blur the lines of authority
between public and private entities. The RAND
recommendations for the ARMS program and
the results of the VA Medical Center partner-
ship illustrate the need for a balance between
flexibility in operations and government over-
sight and accountability. 
6. Efficiency can result from the sharing of pro-
duction. The Army’s Aberdeen Test Center,
Letterkenny Depot, and Anniston Depot utilize
facilities to share the production of goods with
private partners, resulting in lower overhead
costs, investments in facilities, and more 
efficient use of its workforce.
7. Understanding market demand for new 
product/service is vital. Though the Dulles
Greenway eventually recovered financially and
has increased ridership, it nearly went bank-
rupt in failing to adequately predict the number
of riders, the marketing needed, the toll that
customers were willing to pay, and subsequent
revenue that would result.
8. Private financing can be utilized to fund proj-
ects the government cannot afford. Virginia
Strengths and Weaknesses of Public-
Private Partnerships
Strengths 
• PPPs allow the government to finance facilities
or services needed, but which it could not
afford to publicly fund.
• PPPs make the most productive use of valuable
government assets by bringing in revenue,
reducing overhead costs, and providing invest-
ments for facilities; and can be used to address
excess capacity.
Weaknesses
• Authority can be blurred and roles made
unclear between public and private partners.
• The government assumes a greater portion of
risk compared to other forms of privatization.
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authorized the private Dulles Greenway to 
pay for needed infrastructure that the state
could not afford with its huge deficits. The VA
Medical Center used private financing to build
an energy facility to improve capabilities.
Projects providing public services with private
financing, building, and operations are widely
being used, enabling infrastructure to be
improved without raising taxes or draining
scare government resources.84
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Definition
Government entrepreneurship is the development
of separate fee-for-service entities operating within
a governmental agency. These entities compete 
to sell services to other government agencies and
often contract with the private sector to provide 
the services offered, while a core staff of govern-
ment employees retains managerial control over
the operation. 
The term “franchising” is often used in place of
“entrepreneurship.” In this context it does not refer
to the traditional franchise arrangement wherein 
a private business is given a license to operate a
service on government land (e.g., a gas station or a
fast food outlet) or to provide a service government
traditionally provided. 
Various Forms
Within the federal government, entrepreneurship
has taken several forms. Under the 1994 Government
Management and Reform Act (GMRA), franchises
were allowed to form in order to eliminate the
monopoly of administrative services offered to the
government. These “enterprises” or “franchises”
were expected to operate within a competitive
environment and offer better services for lower costs.
Previously, cross-servicing agreements enabled
agencies to charge fees to other agencies for services
provided, but the 1994 law allowed the formation
of separate franchise funds to operate with more
financial freedom and act more like private busi-
nesses. Government agencies now have the ability
to choose among the service providers or retain an
in-house arrangement in order to obtain the best
services based on quality, cost, and other factors. 
In addition to franchises, entrepreneurship in 
government can take the form of long-term
Government-Wide Acquisitions Contracts (GWACs)
for IT products, where the sponsoring enterprise
assembles an acquisition contract that other agen-
cies can use for a fee. The Clinger-Cohen Act of
1996 allowed for the formation of these IT GWACs. 
Case Studies
1. Franchise Fund Pilot Program
Six franchise funds were established as a pilot pro-
gram through the 1994 GMRA. These funded pilot
programs act as internal entrepreneurs and are
authorized to provide their customers—other gov-
ernment agencies—with administrative support ser-
vices. The goal of this program was to lower the
unit cost of administrative services by introducing
competition and economies of scale, and eliminat-
ing duplicated services. The pilot program also
established several operating criteria, including
competition, transparent pricing, full cost recovery,
surge capacity, performance measurements, and
benchmarks against competitors. 
In 2002, John Callahan reported on the achieve-
ment of the GMRA experiment.85 He assessed the
overall program to be a success; however, this con-
clusion is reached by measuring only the limited
available data that compares the first two full years
of operation: FY 1997 and FY 1998. In these two
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enues. For the funds with available data, the growth
in revenues averaged 128 percent, with a low of 1
percent to a high of 468 percent. The vast majority
of this business (from 50 percent to 95 percent) was
handled by private contractors, yet the services
were managed and monitored by the government
employees who have the organizational knowledge
to meet the needs of their customers. In addition to
financial strength, the funds demonstrated their
ability to compete—four franchises competed for a
total of 60 bids and won 43 to 100 percent of the
competitions. Finally, savings were achieved for
customers of four funds. The results are given in
Table 6 below for five franchises; two of them are
described in more detail below.
Federal Occupational Health 
The Federal Occupational Health (FOH) fund was
created in the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) to provide basic occupational
health services to locations across the country,
ranging from physical and mental health care to
workplace safety training and hazard protection.
The agency manages the subcontracting service
providers—84 “core” government employees over-
see the tasks of over 1,600 contracted employees.
These core employees, similar to those in other
funds, have developed essential managerial and
marketing skills to provide high-quality, customer-
focused services, often custom-tailored to fit the
customers’ needs. This attention to the customer
has paid off—the FOH received 88 to 92 percent
“excellent” or “good” responses on five measures
of customer satisfaction. However, some fund man-
agers were concerned that with these marketable
customer skills, their core staff would move to pri-
vate industry for better pay.
As a measure of the fund’s overall success, the
FOH managed to achieve a 10 percent growth 
in revenue from FY 1996 to FY 2001 (from $84.9
million to $93.6 million). In addition to creating
revenue growth, the FOH worked with HHS to
intelligently manage risk. One of the potential dis-
advantages of the franchise structure is that, similar
to PPP initiatives, the government assumes a higher
level of risk. While the FOH aggressively sought
new customers, offering such quick services as the
anthrax inoculation needed by the U.S. Army, the
franchise was careful not to take on risks that could
have been too great. HHS turned down a proposal
by the FOH to manage environmental cleanup of 
a contaminated U.S. Navy site, citing the potential
for FOH to incur costly legal liability for the site.
The FOH has also considered its strengths in 
competing for services, moving more toward rea-
sonably priced, quality services and away from
lower-quality and lower-priced services.
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Treasury Franchise Fund
The Treasury Franchise Fund (TFF) was designated
as a way for the Treasury Department to provide a
wide range of administrative services, from account-
ing and auditor training to mail and messenger ser-
vices. The TFF has a core staff of 490 employees,
with subcontractors performing the majority of the
services (and receiving 83 percent of the revenue).
The TFF was designed with strict rules:
• Operating costs cannot be subsidized. 
• Quarterly statements must be issued. 
• Annual audits must be conducted. 
• Benchmarks are used to measure service 
performance.
But given this strict financial and performance
scrutiny, the business units within the TFF act as
fairly self-sustaining units, as separate private 
entities would.
By FY 2000, the TFF had met all of its benchmarks
of performance, including measures of customer
service, financial self-sufficiency, and competitive-
ness. Compared to the FOH, the TFF has achieved
an even greater growth in revenue, from $38 million
in FY 1997 to $165 million in FY 2000 (an increase
of 334 percent). Additionally, the TFF exceeded its
customer service approval rating of 80 percent in
both 1999 and 2000. High customer approval may
in part be attributed to the fact that customers of
TFF have reduced administrative costs from 7.3
percent of the budget to 5.5 percent. But, given
these successes, the TFF has concerns that its tem-
porary pilot status, as well as impending retirements
of its core staff, will impede its future success.
With this initial success, the Treasury decided in
2000 to launch a new advertising brand called
FedSource, with the three franchises under TFF 
combining to market their services. They currently
maintain a website advertising their services, which 
is indistinguishable from that of a private company.
Other enterprises have followed this marketing
strategy; in 2002, GovWorks was created as a
trademarked brand for an enterprise operating
within the Department of the Interior.
2. Government-Wide Information Technology
Acquisition Contracts87
In 1996, Congress passed the Clinger-Cohen Act,
which replaced the 1965 Brooks Act and enabled
agencies to assemble long-term, government-
wide acquisition contracts, or GWACs, for IT 
products and to charge fees for their use. The goal
of this enterprise was to offer agencies a faster,
cheaper alternative to competing sources and 
writing their own contracts, thereby saving those
administrative costs. 
The National Institutes of Health’s Information
Technology Acquisition and Assessment Center
(NITAAC) stepped up to the challenge and awarded
Indefinite-Delivery, Indefinite-Quantity (IDIQ) 
contracts. These contracts enable companies to
constantly bid for every order through a faster 
purchasing cycle, rather than opening a lengthy
competition process for each order. NITAAC’s 
IDIQ initiative successfully attracted the business
previously lost within its own department. 
In 1996, the Department of Transportation formed 
a franchise called the Transportation Administrative
Services Center (TASC) to handle administrative 
services for a fee. With a focus on providing good
service to customers at a fair price, TASC offered 
a GWAC called Information Technology Omnibus
Procurement (ITOP), which by 1999 was used by
more than four agencies to make 250 orders worth
$851 million. The process benefited the agencies
involved by saving them time; the normal contract-
ing process took approximately one year, while
with ITOP it took a mere six to eight weeks. By
charging fees of 1 percent to 2.75 percent, ITOP
generated income of roughly $20 million from the
orders. To attract more customers, fees are set in a
range based on the amount of work the customer 
is willing to perform. The success of the first ITOP
allowed for an ITOP II, a $10 billion multi-agency
pact awarded in 1999. 
Thus government entrepreneurs took advantage 
of the loosening of government restrictions on 
the procurement process by creating contracts for
agencies to share—saving both time and money.
Once again, entrepreneurs succeeded by seizing 
an opportunity and focusing on customer service
demands. 
40
MOVING TOWARD MARKET-BASED GOVERNMENT
3. The Forest Service88
After staff and budget cuts in the 1990s left the
Forest Service short on skilled staff, the agency
experimented with a plan to create competitive,
self-supporting enterprises within the agency.
Unlike other government businesses that are hesi-
tant to provide services core to their missions, the
Forest Service enterprises utilize the expertise of its
staff to provide trail services and tree assessments
for timber yields, along with more administrative
services like workers’ compensation claims. In the
first year, workers’ compensation services resolved
eight cases that saved the Forest Service $244,000
(as much as $4 million over the course of the
employees’ lives). One employee was able to save
his job by capitalizing on his skills as a tree mea-
surer and sell his services as an entrepreneur. 
In order to give these enterprises the freedom to
take risks and act independently, the Forest Service
had them report to a separate department called the
“reinvention laboratory,” established with the mis-
sion of fostering innovation. Because these enter-
prises must cover all overhead costs, along with
salaries and benefits, the laboratory provides them
with advisory financial services. With this help, the
enterprises are able to keep close watch over their
finances, calculating their true costs and knowing
where they can cut costs (e.g., several offices moved
to lower-cost rental space). In addition to financial
help, the laboratories have supported employees
through the difficult transition from bureaucrat to
entrepreneur, and have enlisted the support of local
managers as well as the union located in the forest
area served by the enterprises (called Region 5).
After four years, Region 5 fostered the growth of 
18 enterprises. Through the financial and manager-
ial support of the laboratory, most of the enterprises
were able to cover their costs within the first year.
Additionally, employees gained valuable marketing,
accounting, and innovative skills through the 
experience. 
4. e-Payroll for the Federal Government
In 2002, the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) started a program called the e-Payroll initia-
tive, which consolidates the entire federal payroll
operations into the hands of four agencies, includ-
ing two franchises: the Department of Agriculture’s
National Finance Center and the Interior Depart-
ment’s National Business Center. Government
agencies must decide which of the four agencies
they will pay to operate their payroll systems. The
idea behind the initiative is that by taking advan-
tage of economies of scale, agencies will be able 
to lower their current costs of cutting checks (costs
which average between $32 to $663 per payee,
annually). 
A 2001 analysis for OMB89 reported that the e-Payroll
initiative could greatly reduce costs and avoid
expensive system improvements with the consoli-
dation of the payroll system. The problems they
identified with the current system included a lack
of standardized payroll processes; software systems
13 to 35 years old supporting 80 percent of payroll
transactions; and potential systems infrastructure
improvements that could cost up to $200 million
per system. To remedy these problems, the report
recommended the following:
• Designate OPM to manage payroll policy and
operations, allowing for a centralized analysis
of processes and better decision-making 
capabilities.
• Standardize federal payroll policies and
processes. This would create cost savings through
easier consolidation, and provide more timely
and improved financial information for man-
agers to use.
• Consolidate systems, allowing for a choice
among two to three providers. This would reduce
costs through economies of scale, and avoid
large-scale system improvement costs associ-
ated with having 14 providers. Consolidation
also reduces the number of government
employees devoted to non-core missions.
• Integrate human resources and payroll processes,
reducing redundancies and lowering overhead.
OPM has adopted many of these suggestions,
including the consolidation of providers down to
four agencies. It estimates that costs of migration of
payroll systems to the four providers will be $40
million this fiscal year and $50 million next fiscal
year.90 Technology replacements for the four sys-
tems will occur in 2005. While this plan will likely
result in savings from consolidation and cost avoid-
ance, it lacks a key element: competition. Since
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agencies are assigned to a service provider, there is
no strong incentive for costs to remain low, and the
initial savings realized may not last. 
Lessons Learned and
Recommendations
1. Government “customers” save money and
receive quality services. Much of the cost sav-
ings is due to the ability of franchises to aggre-
gate the service needs of smaller agencies and
then use economies of scale to charge lower
prices for them.91 
2. Fees paid to enterprises can provide full cost
coverage. With financial help from the reinven-
tion laboratory, Forest Service franchises charged
fees that reflected true hourly rates of their
staff, and most were able to cover costs within
a year. Within one year of the formation of the
six government franchises, three had plans in
place for full cost recovery.
3. Employees develop strong managerial and 
customer-service skills. By having to compete 
with other enterprises, employees must main-
tain a strong focus on customer service and
meeting demand, and have the skills to market
the services and the financial know-how to
cover the costs of operations. While these
highly qualified employees contribute to the
success of the enterprises, managers worry that
these skilled individuals will be lost to higher
paying jobs in the private sector.
4. “Franchise funds” maintain the role of govern-
ment as “manager” while allowing private
contractors to be the “provider.” Close to 80
percent of federal “franchise” revenues go
competitively to private firms,92 while govern-
ment workers with organizational knowledge
are able to maintain control over the opera-
tions and meet the needs of customers. The 
fact that the majority of funds go into private
companies counters the criticism by private
contractors that government businesses unfairly
favor the government.
5. An event or opportunity is often necessary to
enact change. The Forest Service used impending
staff and budget cuts to gain support for enter-
prises as a “do or die” solution. NITAAC and
TASC took advantage of the Clinger-Cohen Act
to develop the successful shared-IT acquisition
contracts.
6. Strong leadership and support at the top is
necessary for success. A business unit within
the Treasury Franchise Fund was forced to shut
down after failing to cover costs in 2000 and
2001. The unit succeeded in 1998 and 1999,
but after a leadership change in the Treasury
Department led to a lack of support and a
more micromanaging style overseeing the unit,
the unit had a high turnover of staff and failed
to perform.93 On the other hand, the leadership
and support given by the reinvention laboratory
was crucial for the success of the Forest Service
enterprises, having offered financial advice and
obtained the support of the regional managers
and union.94
7. Services in demand need to be identified. The
Forest Service staff decided to offer workers’
compensation services when they saw claims
falling through the cracks. The IT GWACs were
a response to the lengthy procurement process
that agencies were willing to pay fees to 
circumvent.
Strengths and Weaknesses of
Government Entrepreneurship
Strengths 
• Franchising provides administrative services to
government agencies in a competitive environ-
ment, thus improving performance and lower-
ing costs 
• Franchising enables government agencies to
acknowledge the true costs of their services,
and subsequently adjust to save costs
Weaknesses
• Funds are relatively independent from political
oversight and accountability to Congress.
• There is a potential for the agency to lose sight
of its core functions.
• There is a tendency not to use competition, and
thus lose the incentive for higher performance
at lower costs.
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8. The focus must be on the primary mission and
political accountability of the agency.
Enterprises need to be monitored to ensure that
the core mission of the agency is not compro-
mised. As Congress loses budgetary control
with the increase of franchises, there is con-
cern about the level of political accountability
that remains. Some of these concerns will be
addressed, as OMB now requires agencies to
report the number of employees funded by fee-
for-service agreements, and is moving to make
the interagency contracts open to competition
more frequently.95
9. Maintaining competition among franchises
will be key to long-term efficiency. While the
OPM e-Payroll initiative will likely result in
savings in the near future, because agencies
are assigned to one of the four franchise
providers, the project will not have the future
benefit of competition.
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Although not a distinctive sourcing strategy, the use
of contractors in security operations (including on
or near the battlefield) poses some unique issues
that are addressed here.
Definition
Using contractors in security operations has devel-
oped as a method to achieve more cost effective-
ness in the military, to compensate for military
personnel cuts, to utilize the technological exper-
tise of contractors, and to allow for flexibility from
congressional troop limits. Contractors on the bat-
tlefield are not considered combatants, but rather
civilians accompanying the force. Contractors pro-
vide the military with a wide variety of services,
ranging from logistics support (i.e., maintenance,
housing, food, and basic health care), recruitment
and training, the development and operation of
new technology, security services for State Depart-
ment personnel, and even military operations.96
These contracts are basically a form of contracting-
out for services (as described in the introduction 
in “Understanding Sourcing Options”). However,
because of the risks involved to individuals and
corporations performing the services, they have
many unique requirements. Nonetheless, the 
overriding consideration is that they, like other 
contracting-out activities, receive their maximum
benefits—in performance improvements and cost
reductions—through the presence of competition;
and they can be acquired and terminated as the
services are needed (rather than hired as perma-
nent government employees—military or civilian). 
Overall, an estimated 1,000 U.S. companies now
provide support of all sorts for the armed services.97
It is clearly a growing trend. In the 1991 Persian
Gulf war there were 10,800 contractor employees
(making up 2 percent of those deployed), while 
in the mobilization in preparation for the 2003
Persian Gulf conflict there were 25,000 contractor
employees (making up 11 percent of the deploy-
ment).98 The positions are frequently filled and
directed by former military officers and enlisted
personnel. Nonetheless, it is a requirement that
contractors send employees who will be stationed
for 30 days or more near the front lines to Fort
Benning, Georgia, for training and equipment
(including seminars on the region they are going to,
and all required documentation and equipment).99
Various Forms100
Theater support contractors provide services to
deployed forces that meet the immediate needs of
the operational commander, conducted under the
authority of the theater principal authority responsi-
ble for contracting (PARC). Examples of services
provided include construction, port operations,
transportation, and security.
External support contractors provide support to
deployed forces that augment the shortage of mili-
tary capabilities through contracts that are adminis-
tered by organizations other than the PARC. Many
external contractors work within a pre-arranged
umbrella contract called the Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), in addition 
to the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program
(AFCAP). Much of this base operating support is
provided to peacekeeping deployments. 
Contractors in Security Operations: 
A Special Case
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Systems contractors provide support to material
systems by enhancing their readiness, and by offer-
ing mission-enhancing and mission-essential main-
tenance and operation services. Many of these
contractors contribute sophisticated technical
expertise to operate some of the equipment used
by the military.
Case Studies
1. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP): Two Cases
Since 1992, the Army has used LOGCAP to hire
contractors to provide logistics and engineering
support to contingency operations. The U.S. Army
Materiel Command centrally manages and admin-
isters the contract, which involves worldwide and
regional planning before the contractors begin. The
Army’s principle is to use the LOGCAP contract as
a last resort measure, such as lack of host nation
support, and to allow military units to fulfill their
primary obligations (without exceeding troop ceil-
ings).101 From 1992 to 1995, LOGCAP provided
logistics support in the form of construction, food
supply, maintenance, and transport services for
seven major operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, 
Saudi Arabia/Kuwait, Italy, and Bosnia. 
Brown & Root in Bosnia
In 1992, the Army contracted with Brown & Root
Services (BRS)—after a competition with three
other companies—to provide logistics services at
military bases and camps in Bosnia. The logistics
services provided included basic life support, engi-
neering, and maintenance work for Operation Joint
Endeavor.102 Both the Army and BRS claim that by
not having the military perform the support services,
the contract saved the government 30 percent in
costs.103 BRS hired about 6,700 workers, and paid
them at lower local wages to perform the tasks 
that would have normally required 8,500 troops (a
personnel reduction of 21 percent).104 Freed from
much of the logistics activity, the units then had
more troops available for combat and humanitarian
operations. 
In spite of these very significant benefits, in reviewing
the operations of BRS in the Balkans, a GAO study105
concluded that the Army needed to provide more
continuous oversight of the contractor to ensure
that costs were controlled. Between 1995 and 2000,
private contractors received 10 percent of the
$13.8 billion spent on operations in the Balkans.
Yet by 2000, the Army was only beginning to
attempt to keep contractor costs down, and was
exercising minimal control over the costs of recurring
services. Employees were found to be frequently
idle, as BRS had hired too many local employees.
Part of this lack of control is attributed to the nature
of the Balkans Support Contract. Because the con-
tract is a cost reimbursement, performance-based
contract, the government gives the contractors a
fair amount of freedom to perform the generalized
tasks required. In addition, the government civil-
ians in charge of administering the contract rotated
every six months, preventing them from developing
an expertise on the contract and from building rela-
tionships with the contractors to ensure efficient
operations. Finally, the study found that the govern-
ment and contract personnel were never clear on
how much authority the government had over the
contracts, nor were they properly trained to imple-
ment such a contract. 
DynCorp in East Timor106
In 1999, the Army called on LOGCAP to provide
heavy helicopter lift support in East Timor, where 
a U.S. force was deployed. The former province 
of Indonesia had mountainous terrain and poor
infrastructure that required the contracting of the
helicopter service for the transport of refugees and
humanitarian supplies. The Army paid DynCorp
$10 million for the contract in order to free up
what would have been a large U.S. military pres-
ence on the island for an indefinite period of time.
The soldiers used for supervision were deployed
from an Army Reserve unit, a unit under the opera-
tional control of the Army Materiel Command (AMC),
the LOGCAP manager. DynCorp had to quickly
complete a market survey in order for LOGCAP to
estimate the costs and to ensure that the contract
would be feasible. Once the contract was authorized,
DynCorp and its subcontractors prepared for the
helicopter mission and ground support required to
replace the Navy and Marine Corps forces. After
several days, a base camp was constructed to
receive the helicopters and for DynCorp staff. The
helicopters were able to complete more than 39
flying hours, transporting 434 passengers and over
28,000 pounds of cargo in just nine days.107 Thus
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the contractor was able to quickly respond and
meet the entire needs of the Army in East Timor
while allowing the U.S. military to perform impor-
tant functions elsewhere. 
2. Logistics Support for Weapons Systems:
Two Cases
Because of the high skill required to maintain many
of today’s modern weapon systems, contractors
have been increasingly involved—first, in the
United States and, in growing numbers since
Vietnam, on or near the front lines. 
In 2002 the GAO examined a large number of 
contractor-supported weapon systems used by the
Army and Navy.108 The average projected cost sav-
ings were 20 percent, and significant performance
benefits were also projected. The Army and Navy
broadly measured the performance of the contrac-
tors between 1998 and 2001. The contractors for
the Army performed “satisfactory” or above in 98
percent of 100 cases, and 93.4 percent of contrac-
tors were “satisfactory” or above for 802 cases in
the Navy. However, the GAO found that costs were
not adequately monitored—either before or after
the contractor involvement—so demonstration of
the savings was difficult. 
Additionally, the study pointed out a number of areas
to focus on in such contract work in the future: 
• The use of contractors in support of weapons
systems reduces the minimum amount of 
technical skills for military personnel that are
required for war-fighting capability. (So care
should be paid to training in this area.) 
• There are concerns with contractors on the 
battlefield regarding their willingness to stay on
or near the battlefield during hostilities, which
could weaken wartime missions. (Although
current experience—due to their military back-
grounds—has not found this to be the case.) 
• Protection of the contractors requires diverted
personnel and resources. (So thorough planning
is required for deploying, protecting, and man-
aging contractors, and verifying compliance.)
• Because contracts are treated as relatively fixed
obligations, there is limited flexibility with
funding. This limits the transfer of funds to
respond to changing needs and requirements 
of weapons systems. (So contractors should
provide adequate flexibility.) 
• DoD must assure that contractor maintenance
costs for their original equipment is reasonably
priced.
Air Force F-117 Aircraft Support109
In 1998, the Air Force entered into a contract with
Lockheed Martin to provide the systems support 
for the operation of the F-117 fleet. The contract,
called Total System Performance Responsibility
(TSPR), had built-in performance measures and
projections of cost savings, in addition to profit
incentives for improvements in the reliability of the
fleet.110 The contract also required the company to
respond to maintenance requests within 24 hours. 
Within two years, savings of $30 million were
achieved,111 the majority of which derived from the
reduction in personnel from 242 to 55 in the gov-
ernment’s F-117 System Program Office. Personnel
reductions were estimated to save $90 million over
the life of the contract, and with other efficiencies
incorporated, total savings are estimated at $170
million. In addition to cost effectiveness, the con-
tract provided performance improvements to the
fleet. All of the TSPR performance measures were
exceeded. The Air Force sets a goal of keeping the
number of non-mission-capable aircraft down to 
7 percent of the fleet; the rate for the F-117 was 5
percent the first year, decreasing to less than 3 per-
cent by 2001, significantly less than many (most)
Air Force systems.
Deployment Through Private Transportation 
The crucial mission of transferring deployed troops
is increasingly performed by the private sector.
During the Persian Gulf War, 85 percent of troops
and cargo were transported by commercial aircraft
and ships. Since then, the military has sought to
reduce deployment time with upgrades; however,
the military is facing shortfalls and is turning to
commercial aircraft and shipping to meet transport
needs.112 The Air Force is planning to purchase, 
or lease, commercial jetliners from Boeing (for
transportation as well as for refueling), while the
Military Sealift Command charters foreign vessels
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from allies. Even though the private sector is able
to fulfill this important role and assist the military
in meeting surge requirements, there are still 
concerns regarding security. A 2002 GAO study113
found that there are serious risks posed to commer-
cial ships and commercial seaports being used for
troop deployment, as the DoD is limited in its 
ability to provide adequate security at various
stages in transit. With an increase in reliance on
commercial craft for deployment, there is greater
potential for harm as these craft enter regions in
close proximity to the battlefield. Therefore, the
DoD needs to assess these new security risks and
take appropriate measures to address them. 
Lessons Learned and
Recommendations 
1. Use of contractors allows military to circum-
vent troop ceilings. When Congress placed a
limit of 20,000 troops to be stationed in Bosnia,
the executive branch circumvented that restric-
tion by providing another 2,000 contractors.114
This allowed the Army to move support func-
tions to contractors so the remaining troops
could focus on peace operations. Contractors
are also able to hire local citizens in a station
where there are caps on the number of military
and civilian personnel. This practice does raise
issues as to the level of authority the executive
branch assumes when working around con-
gressional troop limits. 
2. More continuous oversight of the contractor is
required to ensure that costs are controlled.
As the GAO study on contractors supporting
weapons systems demonstrated, the DoD often
does not maintain adequate information on 
the costs and performance exhibited over the
course of the contract, and how it compares to
initial expectations.
3. Deployment of temporary workers is cost-
effective. Since the Gulf War, overall military
forces have fallen by 500,000, but the number
of regional operations has increased. To com-
pensate for the loss of military personnel, the
DoD and State Department have been using
temporary, private contractors to save money
and fill in workers for short-term use, allowing
remaining troops to focus on fighting.
4. Commercial transportation can compensate
for low capacity in the military. The use of pri-
vate ships, aircraft, railroads, and trucking can
fulfill the growing demands of the military to
meet capacity requirements. 
5. More permanent government contract admin-
istrators/managers should be hired to better
oversee commercial contracts. The Brown &
Root case demonstrates how a lack of consis-
tent personnel to administer contracts lessened
government control, and resultant cost effective-
ness, of the contract.115
6. Proximity to the battlefield can endanger con-
tractors, even with legal protections in status.
The Geneva Convention recognizes the status
of contractors as “Civilians Accompanying the
Force” (CAF), yet this status is irrelevant if the
enemy does not recognize it. Additionally, 
contractors who support weapon systems in a
Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Contractors in Security Operations
Strengths 
• The use of contractors allows military personnel
to focus on core missions and stay within troop
ceilings.
• Cost savings are achieved through flexibility
offered to the military in hiring contractors to 
provide a service when required.
• The military can take advantage of sophisticated
technology offered through the private sector.
• The military can use commercial transport capa-
bilities to meet surge requirements.
Weaknesses
• The potential unwillingness of contractors to
work during periods of hostility can hinder the
war-fighting capabilities of the deployed troops.
• The need for commanders to offer contractors 
protection can detract from mission.
• The vague legal status of contractors can cause 
difficulties.
• Commercial transport may lack the security that
military transport provides for troops and cargo.
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hostile environment are evolving away from a
purely civilian role. This highlights the need for
further examination of the CAF requirements as
the line between combatant and contractor
blurs.116
7. A high degree of planning is necessary for 
contractors on the battlefield to deploy and
operate without detracting from combat 
effectiveness. Because the commander is
responsible for the contractors’ safety, it is
important that detailed plans are made in
advance to cover the contractors’ arrival, num-
bers, positioning on the battlefield, protection,
and emergency life support needs.117
8. Improved security measures are needed for
future private transportation. As the GAO
study demonstrated, the DoD is lacking in 
adequate research, planning, and protection 
for the security needs of commercial ships, 
seaports, railroads, and port workers involved
in transporting military cargo and personnel. 
9. Contractors do not have to follow military
codes of conduct. Private contractors are oblig-
ated to take orders only from their employer
(the firm hired by the DoD), and are not sub-
ject to military discipline. In a case where
DynCorp employees were found to be operat-
ing a sex ring for underaged women in Bosnia,
employees involved were merely fired, and
were not subject to any form of military (or
local) discipline.118 In addition to discipline
issues, because contractors are not required 
to take military orders, they pose a threat to
themselves and raise questions as to the level
of responsibility that military personnel have
over their safety. 
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From the cases examined, one can reach two over-
riding conclusions:
• Competition, when properly emphasizing both
performance and cost (i.e., best value), can
have significant benefits—specifically, in
achieving better results at lower costs, regard-
less of whether the winner is the public or the
private sector.
• However, this is not automatically achieved. It
requires the government to properly manage
the winner (again, either public or private 
sector) and to have a credible option of reintro-
ducing competition should performance fall off
or costs rise.
It is also clear from the examples studied that there
is a wide variety of forms that the shift from the
“government as the doer” to the “government as
the manager of the doers” can take; and that in
many circumstances, there really is no single “right
answer.” It is simply a management judgment. How-
ever, almost any choice can have very significant
benefits if properly implemented. Thus, there is a
very real need for the government to educate and
train acquisition personnel in this increasingly
important field so that they will have the manage-
ment skills and the experience to achieve the best
possible results at the lowest possible costs. 
Concerns about the Changing Role
of Government
As would be expected, there has been resistance 
to the implementation of this whole shift in the role
of the government from the “provider” to the “man-
ager of the providers.” Specifically, six concerns
have been raised whenever the issue comes up. 
1. Performance will deteriorate (since industry
will focus on profits and not public needs; and
since the government is more experienced at
these jobs, they will do it better).
2. Costs will be higher (since government
employees are paid less than in industry and
the government doesn’t have to add on a “fee”).
3. The promised savings (from the competitions)
will not be realized over time.
4. Small businesses will be negatively impacted
(since the small contracts will now be part of 
a much larger overall competition for the full
function).
5. A large number of government employees will
be involuntarily separated (as a result of their
either losing the competition to the private 
sector or as a result of their having to become 
much more efficient in order to win the 
competition).
6. There will be a significant loss of control by
government management (as a result of con-
tracting out much of the work).
It might be noted that these six points are not listed
here in priority order (in fact, the fifth and sixth
items are the ones of greatest concern to the
employees and to the government, respectively);
but they are usually not explicitly raised—except
by the politicians. Rather, when trying to argue
against any form of shift of government functions,
Findings and Conclusions
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they will raise the first four points. But the last two
are implicit—and the biggest barriers. 
Importantly, each of these six points has a valid basis
for concern, and needs to be explicitly addressed
in any government decision making as it shifts
work to a competitive environment. However, 
the reality is that when each of them is directly
addressed—and in most programs, they have
been—the results indicate that these “concerns”
are not based on realized results, and that the
empirical data refute all six of them. The next 
section will provide the findings based on the case
study results.
Findings
1. Performance Improves Significantly 
As noted above, many of the earlier efforts at shift-
ing the role of government were done at the local
(city) level. In 1995, a survey of 100 of the largest
cities in the United States was conducted with
regard to their efforts at “privatization.”119 (This term
is often used—although improperly—as a collective
term for the various forms of shifting work from a
government monopoly to a competitive environ-
ment.) Of the 66 responding cities, 82 percent
reported that they were satisfied or very satisfied
with privatization, and the remaining 18 percent
were neutral. None said they were dissatisfied. In
explaining their reasons for having decided to pri-
vatize, 54 percent replied that they had done it to
reduce costs, while 30 percent did it to improve
service. However, in after-the-fact reports they
found an average improvement in service delivery
of about 25 percent for each of the four major ser-
vice areas: public works/transportation, public
safety, human services, and parks and recreation. 
Typical results achieved in various studies of city
transportation systems give a feeling for the gains.
For example, one study of Los Angeles public 
transportation from 1980 to 1996 showed service
reliability increases of 300 percent and complaints
reduced by 75 percent. Similar results in Denver,
San Diego, Indianapolis, and Las Vegas showed 
service-level increases from 26 percent to 243 per-
cent. It must be emphasized that for these five
examples of public transportation, shifts from a 
public monopoly to a competitive environment not
only improved performance dramatically, but also
achieved savings that ranged from 20 percent to 60
percent, compared to the costs of the non-competi-
tive services of the past. Another example is that of
Indianapolis’ wastewater treatment where, in the
competitive environment, the city partnered with a
private water supply utility. In this case, employee
accidents fell by 70 percent and effluent violations
fell 86 percent—and costs of the operation’s part-
nership fell by 40 percent.
Similar results have been achieved at the federal
level. For example, when the U.S. Navy changed
from having all its moving being centrally controlled
and allocated by the military traffic management
command (in a non-competitive fashion) to allow-
ing sailors to choose their own moving companies
from the private sector (in a competitive fashion),
Common Concerns Study Findings
Performance will deteriorate. Performance improves significantly.
Costs will be higher. Costs decrease significantly.
Promised savings will not be realized over time. Promised savings are realized over time.
Small businesses will be negatively impacted. Small businesses have actually benefited.
A large number of government employees will be Involuntary separations of government employees
separated. are few.
Government management has a significant loss  Government actually has greater control.
of control.
Table 7: Clarifying the Debate about Market-based Government
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the customer satisfaction increased from 23 percent
to 95 percent and the damage claims dropped from
1 in 4 to 1 in 12 moves. As another example, when
the British privatized their telecommunications ser-
vice in 1994, the call failures dropped from 1 in 25
to 1 in 200, and the number of public pay phones
increased by 83 percent.
Finally, there have been many examples in the
Department of Defense in recent years where they
have shifted from having government workers per-
form equipment maintenance (known as “organic
maintenance”) to having the work competitively
sourced in one form or another. In each case, there
was a significant improvement in the availability
and reliability of the systems, while at the same
time there was a significant reduction in cost. As an
example, when the Navy went (in competition) to a
public-private partnership for the maintenance and
logistics support (spare parts, etc.) of an auxiliary
power unit (APU) for its carrier-based aircraft (from
a prior government monopoly of this work), they
found that the reliability of the APUs increased by
more than a factor of 10. In addition, the mean
flight hours between unscheduled removals for the
P-3 aircraft improved 300 percent, for the F/A-18
aircraft by 45 percent, and for the S-3 and C-2 
aircraft by 15 to 25 percent. Further, when the
Navy went to war in Afghanistan, the public-private
partnership was able to “surge” by 50 percent to fill
all of the emergency demands. As another exam-
ple, when the Navy competitively outsourced its jet
trainer maintenance, its “fully mission capable rate”
increased by 13 percent while the direct man-hours
required for maintenance decreased by 33 percent,
thus showing that the increased reliability was not
achieved by increased costs, but from increased
efficiency in the process.
The fact that the performance increased while costs
went down in these and the other cases described
in “Understanding Sourcing Options” indicates that 
if the contracts are focused on this combination of
increased performance and lower costs, innovation
within the companies will be required to improve
both efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, the
examples show that companies can still make a
profit while the total cost to the government goes
down significantly, allowing the government to
both save money and receive better services. 
2. Costs Decrease Significantly
Many analyses of this shift from the government as
the “doer” to the “manager of the doers” compare
the costs as bid from the competitive environment
with those which were the best estimates of the
government’s actual costs prior to the competition.
As the performance data above indicate, even
though performance improvements were sometimes
the objective of the competitions, there was still a
significant focus on cost reduction; and, in fact, the
cost reductions were achieved. However, in most
cases the government’s purpose in pursuing the
competition was primarily that of cost reduction.
For example, in the Department of Defense there
were 2,138 competitions run from 1978 to 1994
(usually between private bidders and the current
government workforce—where the latter could bid
their “most efficient organization,” and to win, the
private sector had to be 10 percent less than that).
The average cost savings projected as a result of
these competitions was 31 percent (specifically, for
the Army, 27 percent; the Air Force, 36 percent; the
Marine Corps, 34 percent; the Navy, 30 percent;
and the Defense agencies, 28 percent.)120
Subsequently, the General Accounting Office per-
formed a competitive sourcing analysis of the more
recent time period from FY 1995 to FY 1999.121
They looked at 286 “studies” (the term-of-art for
these competitions) by the Department of Defense.
For these, the DoD actually competed 138 between
the public and private sectors, of which 40 percent
were won by the private sector and 60 percent by
the public sector. They also had 148 “direct conver-
sions,” of which 134 were moved from the public
to the private sector (and then competed there), and
the other 14 were actually conversions from the
private sector back to the public sector. From these
286 efforts, the Department of Defense reported
cost savings of 39 percent. The GAO concluded
that they could not precisely verify the savings
(partly because of the difficulty of determining the
actual government baseline cost prior to the com-
petition), but they did state that “the savings from
the studies between public and private sector com-
petitions are substantial and sustained over time.” 
Finally, in another analysis, based on DoD CAMIS122
data of public/private competitions by the
Department of Defense from FY 1997 through FY
2001, where there were 314 comparisons made,
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the number of people required to do the work 
was (on average) reduced by 35 percent; yet only
40 percent of these competitions were won by the
private sector. The conclusion one might reach is
that when the public sector is forced to compete,
they are able to do the same work just as well, or
better, than before the competitions, but with sig-
nificantly fewer people—in fact, frequently with 
20 to 40 percent fewer people.
Interestingly, similar results in terms of the savings
realized have been found at the state and even
local levels, as well as on international comparisons
(as seen earlier in “Understanding Sourcing Options”).
For example, two studies were conducted by the
auditor/controller of Los Angeles County for the
1980s time period that showed savings of 32 percent
and 28 percent.123
Importantly, the productivity gains through this
competitive process resulted, in general, from 
more work performed per employee per unit time,
not from lower wages. A study by the National
Commission for Employment Policy found no sig-
nificant pattern of lower wages paid by private con-
tractors.124 In fact, a detailed survey of municipal
privatization in Illinois found that 78 percent
reported that wages were the same (40 percent) 
or greater (38 percent) than municipal wages paid
for that same work.125 One early study attempting 
to analyze this phenomenon concluded that there
is no statistically significant difference between
municipal and contract work with respect to salaries
or the costs of fringe benefits. The study found that
the observed cost difference is accounted for by
productivity factors (including using lower-skilled
workers for appropriate work, holding managers
more responsible for the work of their employees,
giving first-line supervisors more hire and fire flexi-
bility, using incentive systems, making the work
less labor intensive through capital equipment
investments, and having a higher ratio of workers
to supervisors).126 In fact, in many cases the private
sector will use higher-paid workers because of their
greater experience, innovation, or skills. Thus, if
one higher-paid worker can do the work of three
lower-paid workers, the costs are still significantly
less. (Unfortunately, too often the government uses
individual workers’ hourly pay as the measure of
total cost, which is clearly not an appropriate way
to measure overall productivity.)
3. Promised Savings Are Realized Over Time
The conclusion that promised savings are realized
over time is conditioned by the potential for future
competition to be maintained after the initial award.
In fact, at least two studies have gone back and
shown that when the public sector has won the 
initial competitions, there has been no effort made
to reintroduce the potential for competition and,
therefore, in many of those cases, the promised
savings have not been realized.127 However, when
the potential for reintroducing competition was
present—in order to create the necessary incentives
for either the public or private sector to not only
realize their promised savings but to continue to
introduce productivity innovations for improved
performance at a lower cost—then the promised
savings have been realized (as found by not only the
GAO but also a number of independent studies).
For example, the Center for Naval Analysis
reviewed 16 specific competitions and found that
the average expected savings (as bid by the winner,
whether it be government or private) was 35 per-
cent.128 The actual savings (as measured after the
fact) on those 16 programs was 24 percent, but that
included increased scope and quantity increases 
to the contracts. When those changes mandated by
the government were removed, then the realized
savings for the same scope and quantity as had
been originally contracted was 34 percent. In effect,
not only did the government fully realize the savings
that had been projected, but it also gained signifi-
cant increases in scope and quantity for less money
than had been expended originally for significantly
less work. 
Similarly, a RAND Corporation study of six con-
tracts in which the expected savings for contractor
wins ranged from 41 percent to 59 percent, and for
the government employees’ wins from 34 percent
to 59 percent, found that the contractors’ savings
were sustained over time—but no total data was
kept for the in-house wins, so direct comparisons
could not be made. However, by comparing the
government head counts before the competition
with those promised by the government bidders
(their “Most Efficient Organization” bid) and
observing that the resultant head count was close
to the MEO, there was some confidence that the
promised reductions were realized.129
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One area that the Department of Defense has
recently been moving into is that of having contrac-
tors replace military personnel and/or civilian gov-
ernment workers in areas outside of the continental
United States—including on the “battlefield” (see
“Contractors in Security Operations: A Special
Case”). For example, the firm of Brown and Root
was hired to provide logistics services at a military
base in Bosnia. This had a number of significant
advantages. First, and most obvious, the contractor
was able to do the work with 21 percent fewer
laborers. Second, the contractor was able to hire
workers at local salary levels (which were signifi-
cantly less). Third, the contractor could hire work-
ers as needed and could terminate them when they
were no longer required. Finally, it freed up sol-
diers to perform war-fighting functions. Thus, the
savings to the Army were quite significant—without
any reduction (and in fact with some significant
improvement) in reported performance.130
Similar realized results have been achieved at the
state and local levels. For example, the Public
Service Electric and Gas Company in New Jersey
contracted its recycling responsibilities to another
firm. The private recycling company operates as a
“material recovery facility” and is allowed to charge
lower fees than landfills. With mechanized recycling
and the sale of processed materials, the company
can offer lower rates for disposal. Overall, the real-
ized savings are approximately 42 percent.131 As a
final example, in Chicago the job of towing scrap
vehicles (formerly a government responsibility) 
was given to a private-sector contractor. The private-
sector company actually pays the city $25 per vehi-
cle and then sells the vehicles as scrap, providing
Chicago with revenues of $1.2 million when it was
previously losing money.132
4. Small Businesses Have Actually Benefited
Government at all levels, and especially the federal
government, uses contracting not only to procure
goods and services, but also to achieve social
objectives. There are laws and regulations that pro-
vide preferences to small businesses, women- and
minority-owned businesses, nonprofit corporations,
and firms that hire disadvantaged individuals;
restrictions to buy only American-made products;
preferences to hire veterans; and many others.
These can have an impact on reducing competition
unless these considerations are addressed directly.
Since many innovations and positive competitive
pressures often come directly from small businesses,
this report focuses on them. The conclusion that
one can come to is that, contrary to the percep-
tions, small businesses have actually benefited.
Again, the finding that small businesses have actu-
ally benefited is conditional upon the fact that
when the competitions are being conducted there
is an explicit consideration of the potential small
business impacts. Various techniques can be used
to address this issue, from making the competitions
specific small business set-asides, to allowing extra
credit to small businesses on their bids, to requiring
a significant percentage of the work to be done by
small businesses through the larger prime contrac-
tor. Utilizing these and other techniques, the actual
results have been quite encouraging for small busi-
nesses. When this fact is combined with the reality
that advertising competitions on the Internet has
significantly increased small businesses’ participa-
tion (because they now have as much insight into
the programs as do large companies with big mar-
keting organizations, and because the small firms
now have high visibility to the customer through
their responses on the web), results for small busi-
ness have been extremely positive. For example,
between 1995 and 2001, the Department of
Defense conducted 784 public-private competi-
tions; 79 percent of all the contracts were awarded
to small businesses.133
Additionally, many of the large outsourcing contracts
had requirements for a significant share to go to
small businesses as subcontracts. In fact, two of the
largest awards of outsourcing by the Department of
Defense—the Navy Marine Corps Intranet and the
National Security Agency Intranet (both multi-bil-
lion dollar contracts)—each had a mandate of a 35
percent small business subcontract set-aside that
the winner had to guarantee; and at least 10 percent
of that subcontract effort had to be in direct-labor
costs. This 35 percent requirement (of a multi-billion
dollar contract) is obviously a much larger one
than is typical for a government agency in direct
contracting with small business, and is a large 
benefit to small contractors. 
It must be emphasized that numerous studies show
that a contracted-out activity can be made much
more efficient through reengineering of a signifi-
cant number of multiple functions than if each of
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the small functions was separately contracted out
(see Table 5, showing savings vs. size of the com-
petitive effort.) Nonetheless, the government has
traditionally found it much easier (for both internal
and external political reasons) to separately con-
tract for small awards. (Over 80 percent of the 
public-private competitions by the Department of
Defense have been for fewer than 45 people each.)
This makes no sense from either an efficiency or an
effectiveness perspective. Yet it is greatly encouraged
by the small-business people. The answer, from the
perspective of both government and the small busi-
nesses, is to go to larger contracts but to require
significant small business set-asides within them. 
In this way, one could satisfy the small business
benefits as well as the efficiency and effectiveness
associated with the potential for multi-functioned
integration and economies of scale. This can be a
“win-win” situation, but it does require the small
business interests to recognize the value of the sub-
contracts, not just direct prime contracts from the
government. (Legislation against “bundling” of
small competitions into larger, multi-function com-
petitions would be counterproductive to the gov-
ernment’s interest.)
5. Involuntary Separations of Government
Employees Are Few
The finding that only a small number of govern-
ment employees will be involuntarily separated has
come as somewhat of a surprise, since the above-
noted figures indicate that there are labor savings
of 20 to 40 percent (compared to the original gov-
ernment workforce), even when the government
wins. However, all of the independent studies show
that the vast majority of impacted employees can
be well taken care of through a variety of actions.
Again, this assumes consideration of this issue in the
planning process associated with the competition.
In today’s environment, when a military person 
is replaced by a contractor, that military person
moves into a combat position. On the other hand,
civilian employees of the government have numer-
ous other options. In one study the GAO examined
three DoD competitions134 and found that of over
1,000 civilian positions that had to be reduced as 
a result of the savings on these three competitions
(one in-house win and two contractor wins), 27
percent were transferred, 65 percent voluntarily
retired or separated (17 percent of those who vol-
untarily separated or retired took jobs with the 
contractor) and only 8 percent were involuntarily
separated. Another study led by the Center for
Navy Analysis135 found that the DoD has been very
effective in minimizing involuntary job losses. They
looked at competitions in large depot maintenance
facilities where the promised reductions would
amount to 40 percent of the employees scheduled
to go. They determined that these employees either
found other DoD or federal jobs, that many were
hired by the winning contractor, and that others
chose to retire; only 3.4 percent were actually
involuntarily separated. 
One specific case worth noting was an Army 
competition to replace an in-house group of 400
workers who were maintaining an old logistics
information system written in the COBOL com-
puter language. The Army decided to competitively
outsource this work to any contractor who had an
off-the-shelf commercial software package to do
this work. However, they specified as a condition
of the outsourcing that the winning contractor
would have to hire 100 percent of the workers for
at least one year, and that they would have to agree
to train these workers in a modern computer lan-
guage (e.g., C++). The workers would initially be
utilized to maintain the old system during the tran-
sition and would, with additional training, be of
much greater value to the contractor (or to any
other contractor) than they would have been with
their previous skills. The Army, of course, gained a
much more efficient and effective logistics informa-
tion system in the process. Subsequent testimony
by the employees who had been hired by the win-
ning contractor found that they were extremely
pleased with the outcome of this effort. What this
demonstrates is that manpower considerations can
be made a major part of the competition itself, thus
minimizing the negative personnel impacts.
Similar results (i.e., very few involuntary separa-
tions even though large personnel cutbacks result
from the competitive sourcing process) are found in
studies of competitions at the state and local levels.
For example, a study of the privatization efforts in
Los Angeles County136 found that the elimination of
4,700 positions was accomplished with “only a
handful of layoffs.” Given the difficulty of getting
rid of poor-performing government workers (at the
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local, state, or federal levels), one perspective on
these single-digit impacts is that the employees not
shifted to other jobs or picked up by the winning
contractors are most likely those at the bottom of
the performance or skill rungs. Perhaps these losses
are not that significant to the performance of the
government functions. 
Any time individuals (even a small number) must
be involuntarily separated, there is a potential for
personal hardships. This represents a social prob-
lem that clearly must be directly addressed; the
government, however, cannot be viewed as a guar-
antor of permanent employment (regardless of per-
formance) and still be expected to be efficient and
effective. 
6. Government Actually Has Greater Control 
As noted above, it is essential that when the gov-
ernment makes an award to a performer (either
public or private), it carefully monitors that perfor-
mance using agreed-to metrics on both performance
and cost. Government “control” after the competitive
award is of such concern because many government
managers feel that when they have the employees
directly reporting to them, they somehow think
they have more control than if they have to exercise
control through a contractor. In reality, the govern-
ment has very little ability to hire or fire civil service
workers compared to the ability they have with
contractors. In fact, the data show that there is very
little cost visibility into the total cost of government
work since most government organizations do not
perform activities-based costing and therefore lack
visibility of the indirect costs associated with their
work. Additionally, changing processes within the
government is extremely difficult, and innovation
(as with most monopolies) tends to be stifled.
Therefore, true control over change is minimized 
in such an environment. 
Mayor Steven Goldsmith of Indianapolis asserted
that he has “far more control over contractors than
he ever had over his own in-house workforce; he
can fire a contractor for poor performance but 
cannot do much with or to a malfunctioning city
department.”137 He believed that this increased con-
trol was gained because governments will have to
write a detailed performance specification for the
contract (which they rarely do when the work 
is routinely done in-house), as well as because of
the legendary rigidity of the civil service system
(which is reinforced by union contracts, and which
limits an official’s managerial authority). In essence,
the government managers can now utilize the com-
petitive market to reward or replace, based on the
measured performance and costs, under the con-
tract. And with the threat of potential future compe-
tition, if the results are not the desirable ones, there
is, in fact, greater control—in contrast with the 
government manager’s lack of visibility or control
in the presence of a government monopoly. 
However, this obviously assumes that when the
government awards a contract, it does not turn its
back and walk away. Rather, the government must
assume full managerial responsibility whether the
work is done in-house or by a contractor.
Recommendations on Overcoming
Barriers and Moving Ahead
The empirical data are very clear in refuting the 
six concerns (or perceptions) with regard to the
changing role of the government from “provider” 
to “manager of the provider.” While there have been
significant increases in the number of positions
being shifted, and while President Bush has made
clear the privatization goals of his administration,
there is still significant resistance to making these
changes. This resistance begins with government
workers’ fears about losing their jobs and with gov-
ernment managers’ concerns about loss of control.
These then are reflected by local politicians and, in
turn, at the federal level in Congress, where efforts
have increasingly been made to legislate against
such changes. Further, such changes are strongly
resisted by the federal government workers’
union.138 Since the empirical evidence is so con-
vincing with regard to improved performance and
reduced costs as a result of the presence of com-
petitive market courses (although concerns regard-
ing lower performance and higher costs are still
raised), it is clear that more explicit attention needs
to be given to the political and personal concerns
of the workers and managers—along with educa-
tion on what the actual results are likely to be and
how they can best be achieved. 
This educational process needs to be extended not
just to the federal level but down to the state and
local levels. A 1989 survey of city officials in cities
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with populations of more than 5,000 and county
officials in counties with populations greater than
25,000 found that the greatest impediment to 
privatization by contracting is the fear of loss of
control (which was named by 51 percent of the
responding officials) and that employee (and union)
resistance was second (identified by 47 percent of
the respondents), while “politics” was third (as
named by 42 percent).139 A similar survey of U.S.
state governments in 1992 identified loss of control
and labor problems as the principal impediments
to contracting for services.140 These are concerns
that must be explicitly addressed from perspectives
of unions, government workers, and government
managers. Undoubtedly the best way to address
them is with empirical data and case studies that
address the key concerns (some of which are
described earlier in “Understanding Sourcing
Options”). 
Nonetheless, there are also very real procedural
barriers to be overcome. The most obvious of these
is the procedure for competing the public against
the private sectors at the federal level. This procedure,
which is contained in OMB Circular A-76, was
negotiated 36 years ago between the government
unions and the executive branch, and has been 
in existence ever since. It has a number of major
shortcomings, which were highlighted in a 2001–
2002 congressionally mandated Commercial
Activities Panel study (headed by the GAO).141
• In the first place, the current process uses “low
cost” as the source selection criterion, and thus
eliminates the possibility of making selections
on the basis of “best value,” i.e., balancing 
performance and cost. 
• Second, the comparative “studies” (competi-
tions) take far too long (an average of 25
months from start date until tentative decision
date for the DoD studies from FY 1997 to FY
2001), and they cost far too much (one 2001
estimate ranged from $1,300 to $3,700 for
each position competed).
• Finally, the current process provides no guide-
lines for selecting and grouping functions, which
is highly desirable since the more functions
that can be put together (to allow reengineering
of the process), the greater the potential benefits
in efficiency and effectiveness. 
In addition to the problems with the A-76 process,
there is the critical fact that the government has
very little visibility for its own initial, full-cost base-
line. So there is, in effect, a “Catch-22 ” built into
the process. For instance, the government wants 
a “business case” analysis performed in order to
justify the likely benefits of the competition, but
since no credible baseline is available, it is impos-
sible to generate a valid business case that would
justify running the competition despite the likeli-
hood of significant performance improvements and
cost savings if the competition and management
oversight subsequent to the competition are con-
ducted properly.
What needs to be done to allow, and encourage,
more of a shift in the direction of improved effi-
ciency and effectiveness through the use of com-
petitive market forces? First, and most obvious, is
the need for the government to develop a new
competitive process that is faster, less expensive,
and based upon “best value” competitions. A
November 14, 2002, draft revision of A-76 by the
Office of Management and Budget142 makes these
recommendations, and goes further to recommend
that each agency be forced to define those func-
tions that are “inherently governmental”—under
the assumption that all others should be subject 
to competition within the next five years. It also
requires that full metrics should be kept on perfor-
mance and cost, regardless of whether the competi-
tions are won by the public or private sector.
Implementation of recommendations such as these
is critical. Obviously, there will be significant 
resistance; but if the government is to move in 
the direction of increased efficiency and effective-
ness—in a period of declining budgets (particularly
at the state and local levels, but also at the federal
level)—then this resistance must be overcome. 
One way to overcome resistance to this change is
to increase education and training in this area.
Increasing the visibility of  the results achieved and
the best practices for achieving them would likely
garner wider acceptance and understanding of 
the benefits (higher performance and lower costs)
realized from a shift from monopoly government
performance of essential functions to government
management of competitively awarded performers
(either public or private). This is too important a
result not to take full advantage of it.
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